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Abstract
Maintenance of  status quo law school curricular design and delivery, along with the continued
marginalization of  live client clinic programs, and the discordant objectives of  law schools as
compared to the expectations of  Bar passage, serve to stifle the role of  juridic practitioners in the
service of  justice. Decades of  careful scholarship regarding the problems associated with the
quality of  legal education have repeatedly called for curricular revisions that should enhance the
knowledge and skill base of  graduates, develop their level of  preparedness to actually serve in the
profession, and demonstrate care for students. And while there has been a commitment on behalf
of  law schools to establish experiential educational opportunities through participation in live
client clinics, far too often these clinics appear as appendages to the core curriculum and are
marginalized as a result. This essay has two objectives – to address the serious and well-known
shortcomings associated with law school pedagogy, and to stimulate consideration of  alternate
pedagogical methods that draw upon student development theory to enhance what education
scholars know about cognition. 
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I. Introduction
Twentieth-century American philosopher, John Dewey, famously suggested that much of  what
passed for pedagogy was the product of  an authoritarian dispensation of  instruction meant to
maintain control over curriculum and classroom behavior. To facilitate an authoritarian pedagogy,
Dewey contended that teachers at all levels of  instruction adopted the belief  that “the Lord speaks
through me.” Simply put, teachers are the sifters and transmitters of  wisdom and knowledge, and
they alone serve as the arbiters of  truth. 
In this essay I assert that maintenance of  status quo law school curricular design and delivery, along
with the continued marginalization of  live client clinic programs, and the discordant objectives of
law schools as compared to the expectations for Bar passage, serve to stifle the role of  juridic
practitioners in the service of  justice. This essay has two objectives: 1) to address the serious and
well-known shortcomings associated with law school pedagogy; and 2) to stimulate consideration
of  alternate pedagogical methods that draw upon student development theory to enhance what
education scholars know about cognition. While the substance of  this essay may apply to cross-
cultural experiences, it is deeply rooted in the pedagogical methods employed by law schools in the
United States. Furthermore, while I make reference to them, this is not an essay about innocence
project clinics, or wrongful and unlawful conviction per se. The three articles referenced below, as
well as discussion of  wrongful and unlawful conviction courses, serve to reveal a deeply rooted
pedagogical problem existing in the majority of  US law schools. They will be used here for
illustration purposes only. 
Three recently published law review articles advocate for the implementation of  live-client law
school-based innocence projects as a heuristic tool that offers students interested in careers in
criminal law real world legal experience.1 Two of  the articles focus attention on pragmatic
considerations required of  innocence project clinic directors,2 while the third moves the discussion
further in the direction of  desired pedagogical outcomes generated by student participation in
innocence project investigation and litigation work.3 For current and prospective clinic directors
each article provides invaluable schematic insight into ways of  conceiving innocence projects, and
the pedagogical reasons for doing so, from well-known and trusted clinic directors and legal
scholars. 
1 Keith Findley. The Pedagogy of  Innocence: Reflections
on the Role of  Innocence Projects in Clinical Legal
Education, 13 Clin. L. Rev. 231 (2006); Jan Stiglitz,
Justin Brooks, & Tara Shulman, The Hurricane Meets
the Paper Chase: Innocence Projects New Emerging
Role in Clinical Legal Education, 38 Cal. W.L. Rev. 413
(2002); Daniel S. Medwed, Actual Innocents:
Considerations in Selecting Cases for a New Innocence
Project, 81 Neb. L. Rev. 1097 (2003). 
2 Jan Stiglitz, Justin Brooks, & Tara Shulman, The
Hurricane Meets the Paper Chase: Innocence Projects
New Emerging Role in Clinical Legal Education, 38
Cal. W.L. Rev. 413 (2002); Daniel S. Medwed, Actual
Innocents: Considerations in Selecting Cases for a New
Innocence Project, 81 Neb. L. Rev. 1097 (2003).
3 Keith Findley. The Pedagogy of  Innocence: Reflections
on the Role of  Innocence Projects in Clinical Legal
Education, 13 Clin. L. Rev. 231 (2006)
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In order for the good ideas espoused by Keith Findley, Jan Stiglitz, Justin Brooks, Tara Shulman,
and Daniel Medwed (as well as the recently published reports encouraging dramatic changes to law
school curricula in general) to generate the kind of  change I believe is desired by each, a
fundamentally different law school curriculum must take shape. At the present time, their good
work, and the efforts of  hundreds of  others who direct and invest in the scholarship of  live client
innocence projects across the United States4, exists at the margins of  law school curricula.5
Why is it that given the relevance of  twenty years or more of  scholarship regarding the leading
causes of  wrongful and unlawful conviction, very few law schools offer an elective course on this
topic, or better yet, integrate identification and analysis of  procedural errors leading to unsafe
verdicts across the curriculum? In the realm of  criminal law and procedure I view an integrated
three-year long discussion of  how to identify and avoid errors to be important to a prospective
lawyer’s training. Why? Because lawyers, both prosecutors and defense attorneys, must understand
the multitude of  ways cases can go bad in order to avoid them. They must be armed with the
critical analytical skills necessary to deconstruct the political, economic, and cultural explanations
for why the institutions responsible for investigating, prosecuting, and defending suspects charged
with crimes engage in behaviors known to generate wrongful and unlawful convictions. 
To the best of  my knowledge, these subjects are rarely discussed as part of  the core law school
curriculum in the US. Rather, students are bombarded with an onslaught of  black letter law that
they need to memorize. This is particularly the case during the first year of  law school with its
emphasis on case law, statues, and rules.6 In short, “the first year experience as a whole, without
conscious and systematic efforts at counterbalance, tips the scales, as Llewellyn put it, away from
cultivating the humanity of  the student and toward the student’s re-engineering into a ‘legal
machine.’”7 The failure of  faculty to generate an integrated curriculum8 that links legal doctrine
from one subject to the next speaks to an overriding concern among pedagogues that law school
faculty will not be able to “provide thematic unity, provide comparative insights from other
cultures, bring to bear new theoretical critiques, or integrate aspects of  their scholarship into their
teaching.”9
Second and third year curricula are likewise burdened by the absence of  a coherent integrated
curriculum that Stuckey et al. argues represents little more than “a series of  unconnected courses
on legal doctrine.”10 The problem for Stuckey et al. is that faculty make little effort to integrate
4 Innocence projects now exist in 47 states. 
5 A. Amsterdam. “Clinical Legal Education – A 21st
Century Perspective.” 34 J. Legal Educ. 612 (1984).
There are law schools that have moved in an earnest way
to incorporate clinics and clinic directors in a more
wholistic way into the law school curriculum. In general,
however, law school clinic directors are not eligible for
tenure, and tend to be treated as second class citizens
within law school departments. For examples of law
schools that have sought to create an integrated
curriculum see Gonzaga University School of Law, New
York University, CUNY University, Yale Law School,
and Southwestern Law School. Three states have
recently moved to require new law school graduates to
work as apprentices with law firms before commencing
their practice (Delaware and Virginia), and to work
directly with a mentor (Georgia). 
6 Ronald Chester. 1993. “Reshaping First-Year Legal
Doctrine: The Experience in the Law Schools.” 20 Fla.
St. U.L. Rev. 599.
7 Sullivan et al Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the
Profession of  Law. The Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of Teaching: 17. 
8 By way of example, Chester proposes combining
Contracts, Torts, and Property in a single course he calls
Civil Obligation. Civil and Criminal Procedure would be
combined into a course on Procedure. Op. cit 19 at 599.
9 Supra note 7 at 17. 
10 Roy Stuckey et al. 2007. Best Practices For Legal
Education: A Vision and A Road Map. Clinical Legal
Education Association: 17. 
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upper-division course themes, concepts, and ideas, nor do they “help students progressively
acquire the knowledge, skills, and values needed for law practice.”11
To be fair, by way of  Socratic method law school faculty have attempted to introduce a semblance
of  dialogicality to classroom instruction. Through intensive questioning, parrying, further
questioning, and so on of  law school students faculty attempt to probe more deeply the application
of  theoretical concepts to a set of  fact patterns.12 Application of  the Socratic method to classroom
pedagogy is designed to teach students to “think like lawyers.”13 At its best, it avoids rote
memorization, a practice that would scarcely generate the skill-base required of  real world
attorneys.14 Following Jackson15, the Socratic method is beneficial in three ways “(1) it gives
professors the ability to teach large bodies of  students in an active manner; (2) it is instrumental in
teaching cognitive skill development – to teach students to “think like a lawyer”, and (3) it helps
students to hone their verbal skills.” That said, even those who support the application of  the
Socratic method have articulated ways to improve it so as to avoid the negative consequences that
have been identified as “terrorizing students,” “perpetuating gender-based discrimination,”
“maintains hierarchy,” “encourages time wasting,” “induces student laziness,” and “fails to teach
necessary skills.”16 Others have argued that, in recognition of  the failure on the part of  faculty to
effectively apply the method, at least some American law schools have slowly moved away from
it.17 In short, what supporters of  the Socratic method appear to be arguing for is a method of
dialogical discourse similar to what I will suggest is needed, complete with an emphasis on rigor
and competent awareness of  the application of  abstract principles to real-world fact patterns. 
But as I will suggest in the second part of  this essay, where application of  the Socratic method is
privileged it serves as a master narrative that guides discourse in a direction most privileged by
faculty. The terms and boundaries of  Socratic questioning are determined by faculty. And while
this criticism has been acknowledged by supporters of  the method,18 the critique typically centers
on whether it biases gendered discourse.19 This is, of  course, a significant consideration but is only
one. The point that I will attempt to make throughout this essay is that a discourse that privileges
authoritative voices couched in a master narrative perpetuates hierarchical political, economic, and
cultural relations that include gender, but reach far beyond it. If  I am correct, the institutional
positioning of  law school training as a system-reproducing steering mechanism will inhibit truly
innovative pedagogical practices. 
11 Id at 17.
12 My thanks to Keith Findlay and Colin Starger for
reminding me of this important pedagogical practice. 
13 Susan Sturm and Lani Guinier. 2007. “The Law School
Matrix: Reforming Legal Education in a Culture of
Competition and Conformity.” 60 Vand. L. Rev. 515.
Jeffrey D. Jackson. 2007. “Socrates and Langdell in
Legal Writing: Is the Socratic Method a Proper Tool for
Legal Writing Courses?” 43 Cal. W. L. Rev. 267.
14 Michael Vitiello. 2005. “Professor Kingsfield: The Most
Misunderstood Character in Literature.” 33 Hofstra L.
Rev. 955; David Garner. 2000. “Socratic Misogyny? –
Analyzing Feminist Criticisms of  Socratic Teaching in
Legal Education.” 2000 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 1597.
15 Jeffrey D. Jackson. 2007. “Socrates and Langdell in
Legal Writing: Is the Socratic Method a Proper Tool for
Legal Writing Courses?” 43 Cal. W. L. Rev., 274.
16 Id at 284–307.
17 Orin S. Kerr. 1999. “The Decline of  the Socratic
Method at Harvard.” 78 Neb. L. Rev. 113. 
18 See supra note 15 at 299.
19 Lani Guenier, Michele Fine, and Jane Balin, Becoming
Gentlemen: Women, Law School, and Institutional
Change. Boston: Beacon Press (1997); Paula Gaber,
“Just Trying to Be Human in this Place”: The Legal
Education of  Twenty Women, 10 Yale J.L. & Feminism
165 (1998); Sarah E. Theimann, Beyond Guiner: A
Critique of  Legal Pedagogy, 24 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc.
Change 17 (1998).
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On the occasions when I have been invited to speak to law schools about the subject of  wrongful
and unlawful conviction I’ve been struck by the lack of  information students possess, regardless of
whether they are 1-L or 3-L, when it comes to police and prosecutorial misconduct, the use of
jailhouse informants, junk science, false eyewitness identification, and false confessions. These are
the now well-researched known causes of  wrongful and unlawful convictions. Add to that list a
host of  other related reasons wrongful and unlawful convictions occur,20 and that are seldom if
ever discussed during the three years a student spends in law school. When combined with a failure
on behalf  of  law school faculty to educate students about the broader sociological and
psychological reasons for institutional behaviors linked to miscarriages of  justice, its no surprise
why generation after generation we continue to witness replication of  those behaviors known to
generate unsafe convictions. So while an innocence clinic can right the injustice of  wrongful and
unlawful convictions through postmortem case analysis and litigation, and may even be able to
penetrate young minds alerting them to the potential pitfalls involved in making and defending a
case, the fact that discussion of  the key structural and institutionally related causes of  wrongful
and unlawful convictions remain outside the dominant law school curriculum suggests that these
ideas, and the faculty who engage the scholarship and teaching of  them, will perennially appear as
zebra mussels affixed to a large ocean vessel navigating the inland waterways separating
“legitimate,” from “illegitimate” discourse.
Missing in the three innocence project clinic articles, as well as the bulk of  legal scholarship
addressing the issue of  law school curricula and pedagogy in the United States, is theoretical
articulation of  the system reproducing function of  law school instruction and consequent practice
by its graduates. Law school education as it is implemented in most law schools in the United
States fails to empower its graduates with the necessary tools to promote critical analysis and
comprehension of  juridic institutions and their real-world functions, thereby making attainment
of  justice, conceived here as a the confluence of  law and morality, a near impossibility.21
My guiding assumptions are by no means novel. Numerous legal scholars, and the American Bar
Association’s (ABA) Section on Legal Education & Admission to the Bar, the Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of  Teaching, and the recently released report by Stuckey et al.,22
have painstakingly attempted to affect a change in entrenched law school curricula to promote 
20 For example, 1) police interrogation tactics (not
necessarily misconduct, but police training in Reid
School tactics designed to generate confessions); 2) plea
bargaining; 3) pretrial discovery; 4) jury perceptions of
defendant guilt based on the fact that they are
defendants in a trial; 5) the Direct Connection Doctrine
(making it difficult for defendants to introduce evidence
of a third party suspect); 6) admissibility of eyewitness
identification; 7) factual guilt determinations on appeal;
8) harmless error; and 9) the expansive application of
the felony murder rule.
21 See supra note 10 at 18–20. This is by no means a
hyperbolic point. Stuckey concludes that poor training
and a dearth of commitment to emphasizing and
properly training young lawyers to address the problems
of the poor and middle classes results in our law schools
failing to meet the needs of justice for the poor and
middle classes.
22 An Educational Continuum Report of  the Task Force
on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap.
(1992) Known colloquially as the “McCrate Report.”
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/publicat ions/
onlinepubs/maccrate.html; R. Stuckey. 2007. Best
Practices for Legal Education: A Vision and A Road
Map. Clinical Legal Education Association. Sullivan et
al. 2007. Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the
Profession of  Law. The Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of  Teaching. www.carnegiefoundation.
org/files/elibrary/educating lawyers_summary.pdf
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teaching styles that are less adversarial in nature,23 more gender neutral,24 less race/ethnically and
class biased,25 and more appropriately directed at teaching students using methods conducive to
critical thought and analysis of  complex legal problems.26
In short, “critics of  the legal profession, both from within and without, have pointed to a great
profession suffering from varying degrees of  confusion and demoralization.”27 Concerns over the
sinking status of  American lawyers in two decades of  public polling data generated numerous
thoughtful reflections regarding ways to improve ethical conduct and professionalism. As it relates
to our concerns here, Bennett claims that law schools should not relinquish a commitment to
teaching “rigorous legal analysis,” but must make certain such analysis is accompanied by “other
lawyerly skills, such as the emerging curricula in alternative dispute resolution [and, I would argue,
wrongful and unlawful conviction], while making all of  it morally relevant.”28 Sullivan et al.
contend that “the challenge for legal education [is] linking the interests of  legal educators with the
needs of  legal practitioners and with the public the profession is pledged to serve.”29 Concern
about the quality of  legal education in general has confounded legal scholars and practitioners for
more than thirty years. For example, in 1983 Gary Bellow sounded the alarm:
“Al Saks once said to me: ‘Well, it seems to me that what you’re saying is that law school is
empirically irrelevant, theoretically flawed, pedagogically dysfunctional, and expensive.’ And I
am, of  course, saying just that. When you add to these deficiencies, the incoherence of  the second
and third-year course offerings, the amount of  repetition in the curriculum, the degree to which
unacknowledged ideology pervades the entire law school experience and the fact that no graduate
of  American law school is able to practice when graduated, you have a system of  education
which, I believe, is simply indefensible.”30
23 Lawrence Krieger, The Inseparability of  Professionalism
and Personal Satisfaction (or Why the Wrong Values
Will Mess Up Your Life), Unpublished Paper Presented
at the Annual Conference of the AALS Section on Legal
Education, Vancouver, B.C. (May 17, 2003); Christophe
G. Courchesne, A Suggestion of  a Fundamental
Nature: Imagining a Legal Education of  Solely
Electives Taught as Discussions, 29 Rutgers L. Rec. 21
(2005). 
24 Supra note 19.
25 Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the
Reproduction of  Hierarchy, 32 J. Legal Education. 591
(1982); Duncan Kennedy, Radical Intellectuals in
American Culture and Politics, or My Talk at the
Gramsci Institute, Rethinking Marxism, 1 (3): 101–129
(1988); Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training
for Hierarchy, in David Kairys (ed.) The Politics of  Law:
A Progressive Critique. New York: Basic Books (1998):
54–75; Karl Klare, Critical Legal Politics: Left vs.
MPM: The Politics of  Duncan Kennedy’s Critique, 22
Cardozo L. Rev. 1073 (2001). 
26 See Todd D. Rakoff, The Harvard First Year
Experiment, 39 J. Legal Educ. 491 (1989); Anthony
Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education as 21st Century
Experience, 34 J Legal Educ., 612 (1984). John Pray
and Byron Lichstein, The Evolution Through Experience
of  Criminal Clinics: The Criminal Appeals Project at
the University of  Wisconsin Law School’s Remington
Center, 75 Miss. L.J. 795 (2006); Filippa Marullo
Anzalone, It All Begins With You: Improving Law
School Learning Through Professional Self-Awareness
and Critical Reflection, 24 Hamline L. Rev. 324 (2001);
Laura I Appleman, The Rise of  the Modern American
Law School: How Professionalism, German
Scholarship, and Legal Reform Shaped Our System of
Legal Education, 39 New Eng. L. Rev. 251 (2005); Keith
A. Findley, ReDiscovering The Lawyer School:
Curriculum Reform in Wisconsin, 24 Wis. Int’l L. J. 295
(2006); Ronald Chester, Reshaping First-Year Legal
Doctrine: The Experience in the Law Schools, 20 Fla. St.
U.L. Rev. 599 (1993); Marie A. Monahan, Towards a
Theory of  Assimilating Law Students into the Culture
of  the Legal Profession, 51 Cath. U.L. Rev. 215 (2001);
David A. Binder & Paul Bergman, Taking Lawyering
Skills Training Seriously, 10 Clinical L. Rev. 191
(2003). 
27 Sullivan et al. 2007. Educating Lawyers: Preparation for
the Profession of  Law. The Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of  Teaching.
28 Cited in Stuckey op cit note 10 at 20.
29 Sullivan et al. op cit note 27 at 2.
30 Cited by Stuckey in supra note 22 at 2.
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In the sections that follow I’ll attempt to address Bellow’s concern with the “unacknowledged
ideology” that “pervades the law school experience.” It is this ideological influence that shapes
Bellows concern that law school is “empirically irrelevant, theoretically flawed” and is
“pedagogically dysfunctional.” When combined with the current inadequate licensing
requirements established by state Bar examinations,31 it is little wonder that law school graduates
are ill prepared to practice.
In making the case that we must move beyond contemporary pedagogical philosophy and methods
of  training, I share with Dewey the belief  that “It is as if  no one could be educated in the full sense
until everyone is developed beyond the reach of  prejudice, stupidity and apathy.”32 During a
recently held teaching seminar attendees were asked to think about those pedagogical experiences
that had the greatest influence on them.33 Specifically, “Think of  a learning experience in which
you felt you were involved, where everything “clicked,” a time where you felt empowered as a
learner. Or, think of  a learning experience where there was a “disconnect,” a time when you felt
helpless or frustrated as a learner.” I dare say that were I to pose this same question to readers of
this essay the responses would be similar to those of  my colleagues who attended the teaching
seminar. Here’s what I wrote in response to these questions: “Most of  my learning experiences as
a student were frustrating because there was no involvement beyond class work. It was dissatisfying
because it was too abstract. Alienation from the process is what made the experience a failure.”
Recognizing that my response to this question had to fit into a small answer box next to it, there
are no path-breaking insights. However, it’s clear that while I most certainly experienced influential
teachers throughout my many years of  education, the pedagogy was stultifying. Strangely, what
occurred to me as I tried to think about positive learning experiences were those memories I have
of  playing sports – baseball, soccer, and the martial arts. I was a competitive athlete through college
so I can recall with clarity the methods used – orally introduce the skill to be learned, demonstrate
the skill to be learned, and finally, execute the skill to be learned. It was a simple path involving
the instructor in the first two levels of  development, and the player in the third. Once again, it was
1) introduce; 2) demonstrate; and 3) execute. 
Einstein draws a similar analogy when discussing his education in the German gymnasium. Upon
leaving the gymnasium and entering a cantonal school outside of  Zurich, Einstein was exposed to
the pedagogical philosophy of  Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi. Pestalozzi was an educational reformer
who believed that the path to real learning was by having students “visualize images.” Sounding
much like the Montessori method, Pestalozzi believed that learning “began with hands-on
observations and then proceeded to intuitions, conceptual thinking, and visual imagery.”34 For
Einstein, this method of  teaching and learning was far superior to his experience in the
31 Society of American Law Teachers Statement on the Bar
Exam: July 2002, 52 J. Legal Educ. 446; C.
Cunningham. 2005. “The Professionalism Crisis: How
Bar Examiners Can Make a Difference.” 74 The Bar
Examiner 6; W. Kidder. 2004. “The Bar Examination
and the Dream Deferred: A Critical Analysis of  the
MBE, Labor Market Control, and Racial and Ethnic
Performance Disparities.” 29 Law and Soc. Inquiry 547;
D.J. Merritt, L.L. Hargens and B.F. Reskin. 2000.
“Raising the Bar: A Social Science Critique of  Recent
Increases to Passing Scores on the Bar Exam.” 69 U.
Cinn. L. Rev. 929. 
32 Joseph Ratner. 1939. Intelligence in the Modern World:
John Dewey’s Philosophy. New York: Modern Library:
605. 
33 Northern Arizona University Teaching Seminar 2008:
Creating Significant Learning Experience for Students
in Gateway Classes. May 13–15, 2008. 
34 Walter Isaacson. Einstein: His Life and Universe. New
York: Simon & Schuster. 2007: 26. 
gymnasium, which was based on authoritarian administration of  rote drills, memorization, and
force-fed facts.35
Far too often appearing like the German gymnasium of  Einstein’s day, law school pedagogy as it
manifests in the United States, fails to properly prepare students for real-world practice. In its
failure, law schools must accept responsibility for their role in inhibiting the realization of  justice.
To accept responsibility would mean to acknowledge the shortcomings of  current pedagogical
practices and to redesign them in accordance with contemporary knowledge of  student
development theory. If  we are truly committed to educating students to their civic and professional
responsibility to promote justice we must change our current pedagogical paradigm. 
Einstein stated, “The significant problems we face cannot be solved at the same level of  thinking
we were at when we created them.”36 What is unique with regard to the approach that I bring to
this discussion is the application of  postmodern and Lacanian insights, and the sociology of  social
reproduction through education. Contextualizing this discussion through these lenses
accomplishes two prevailing goals. First, it theoretically locates the more than a century old law
school curriculum within its proper political, economic, and cultural context to view it as a system
reproducing steering mechanism designed to maintain status quo institutional arrangements.37 The
second reason for applying postmodern Lacanian analysis, and social reproduction theory to
analysis of  law school curricula is to offer an alternative. By drawing on the sociology of  education
and locating analysis of  law school curricula within the context of  Lacan’s master and university
discourses I am positioned to better understand the ways in which law schools institutionally
construct divided subjects, socialized through a master juridic narrative, who continue to
perpetuate behaviors known to generate errors leading to wrongful and unlawful convictions. 
II. An Integrated Theory Of Legal Education As Hegemon
For the last two decades sociological and criminological theoreticians have attempted to bridge
paradigmatic divides by developing integrated theories that are designed to analyze the full range
of  micro and macro influences constituting human behavior. For example, in sociology Anthony
Giddens38 proposed his “structuration theory” which consisted of  four levels of  analysis that
would generate an integrated qualitative and quantitative research model – I Hermeneutic
Elucidation of  Frames of  Meaning; II Investigation of  Context and Form of  Practical 
35 Id. 
36 http://www.quotedb.com/quotes/11.
37 In times of crisis, institutions can be adjusted to respond
to perceived crises in important state sectors. As an
autopoitic (self correcting) state strategic selection
mechanism, education is an institution that plays an
important role in reproducing status quo hegemonic
political, economic, and cultural relations. I contend
that law school curriculum and pedagogy exist as a
master narrative due to its continued role in shaping
dominant culturel narratives articulating juridic
normativity. The remainder of this essay will ouline the
specific manifestations of this process, and the resulting
marginalization of alternative or counter-hegemonic
narratives such as those generated by live client
innocence projects and other clinical programs. For a
detailed account of state strategic selection as autopoisis
see Bob Jessop, 1990. State Theory: Putting Capitalist
States in their Place, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania
State University Press; Rene B. Bertramsen, Jens Peter
Folund Thompsen & Jacob Torfing. 1991. State
Economy & Society, London: Unwin Hyman; Robert
Schehr, The Criminal Cases Review Commission as
State Strategic Selection Mechansim, 42 Am. Crim.
L.R. 1289 (2005). 
38 Anthony Giddens. 1984. The Constitution of  Society:
Outline of  the Theory of  Structuration. Berkeley:
University of California Press. 
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Consciousness (The Unconscious); III Identification of  Bounds of  Knowledgeability; IV
Specification of  Institutional Orders. With each level Giddens moved from the level of
subjectivity, self-awareness, and interpretation, to an analysis of  social systems. By far the most
ambitious effort to generate integrated theory has taken place among postmodern criminologists.
In 1995, Bruce Arrigo introduced the idea of  postmodern theoretical integration.39 His work was
followed in 1997 by Dragon Milovanovic who introduced the idea of  theoretical integration as a
way to advance postmodern theorizing about crime and crime causality.40 In 1998, Gregg Barak
published his book, Integrated Criminologies.41
For Arrigo, Milovanovic and Barak, the prevailing motivation for integration is enhanced
understanding of  the fluidity of  social systems and the constitution of  meaning. As opposed to
engaging analysis of  specific topics through the prevailing and necessarily limiting academic
disciplines, Barak encourages us to construct a new paradigm of  interdisciplinarity that will enable
us to be open to new goals.42 Following Arrigo, postmodern integration refers to, “relational,
positional, and provisional function to interpret, reinterpret, validate, and repudiate multiple
discourses and their expressions of  reality construction in divergent social arrangements.”43 To
meaningfully construct an analysis of  a social problem “the researcher charts out the relations of
the processes of  social life that constitute the recursive pathways and tipping points in the
integrative field of  crime and crime control. In order to locate these social relations, it is argued,
criminologists can best achieve this objective by unifying the visions and practices of  both
modernist and postmodernist criminology.”44 In Postmodern Criminology, Milovanovic identifies
eight dimensions along which to compare the differences between modernist and postmodernist
thought.45 Through his juxtaposition of  these eight dimensions Milovanovic makes an argument
for an affirmative postmodernism that is at once critical, and transformative. 
There are two related but distinct theoretical paradigms that I believe are relevant to our
understanding of  education as an institution – Lacanian discourse analysis, and social
reproduction theory. From a conventional theoretical perspective it may seem that integrating
these paradigms violates disciplinary specializations, levels of  analysis, and possibly even the
conceptual foundations upon which the theories are based. But as I think will become clearer as I
move through this discussion, when presenting an assessment of  student learning theory there are
actually multiple levels of  analysis at play and I am attempting to capture some aspect of  each. For
example, while Lacan’s psychoanalytic semiotics emphasizes the subject’s perennial struggle for
wholeness, a subjective level of  analysis, he locates this process as part of  a recursive relationship
between hermeneutics and power structures (master and university discourses). Theories of
dialogicality and cognitive approaches to student learning also tend to focus on ways of  promoting
care and hope through authenticity in speech situations. The formative question following
Lacanian analysis is whether one can ever achieve “authenticity.” While it may be the case that
subjects are always searching for ways to complete what may be a perennially illusive puzzle
39 Bruce Arrigo. 1995. “The Peripheral Core of  Law and
Criminology: On Postmodern Social Theory and
Conceptual Integration.” Justice Quarterly 12(30):
447–559.
40 Dragon Milovanovic. 1997. Postmodern Criminology.
New York: Garland Press. 
41 Gregg Barak. 1998. Integrating Criminologies. London:
Allyn and Bacon. 
42 Id at 14. 
43 Id at 226.
44 Id at 231.
45 Supra note 40 at 3–24. The eight dimensions are: (1)
society and social structure, (2) social roles, (3)
subjectivity/agency, (4) discourse, (5) knowledge, (6)
space/time, (7) causality, and (8) social change.
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comprising their “true” self, that in no way suggests that subjects are inauthentic. When they speak
from their narrative position as signifiers of  one of  the four Lacanian discourses discussed below,
they are clearly speaking with an authentic voice. Whether by acknowledging this we also wish to
suggest that authenticity is illusive is another question entirely. I do not believe it is. Subjects
process information imperfectly but they do so based on their experiences and cognitive abilities.
Through discourse (including speech), dialogical theory seeks to enhance meaning and promote an
ethic of  care. Finally, social reproduction theory speaks to the sociological aspects of  institutional
hegemony and its reproduction of  class, race/ethnic, gender, religion, and sexual orientation biases. 
It is important to avoid the easy “micro” and “macro” dualism so familiar to social science. The
issue we are confronting in this paper – whether legal pedagogy enhances or diminishes
opportunities for promoting justice – exists on a continuum from subjective interpretations of
political, economic, and cultural stimuli, through analysis of  education as a system-reproducing
steering mechanism. As Marx was fond of  saying, “Men make their own history, but they do not
make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but
under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past.”46 The intention
in this section is to integrate three theoretical paradigms toward a more thoughtful exposition of
law school pedagogy. 
This section proceeds from a discussion of  Lacan’s four discourses, to dialogical theory, and
concludes with the broader structural analysis of  education offered through the lens of  sociology. 
Law School Pedagogy As The Discourse Of The Master
Law schools, like most American educational institutions, ascribe to a pedagogical philosophy based
on the privileging of  a master narrative. This narrative evolved out of  modernist beliefs in the
privileging of  elite white culture as a way to distinguish it from popular or mass culture.47 This was
particularly true of  the emergence of  the modern American law school, where pedagogical reform
efforts like the introduction of  the Langdellian case-study method48 were driven by the “bar’s desire
to entrench the status of  a white, Protestant, native-born ruling class – a desire exacerbated by the
fear the late nineteenth-century influx of  immigrants from Sourthern and Eastern Europe would
undermine the legal profession… This elite would have boundaries erected by ability and ethnicity
– often assumed to be one and the same.”49 Because it failed to take into consideration the political,
economic, and cultural aspects of  the recursive nature of  law as applied to people and institutions,
application of  the Langdellian model to the study of  law significantly divorced law from justice.50
In an article published in 1943, Laswell and McDougal sought to challenge the positivist approach
to the study of  law devoid of  justice.51 Their primary emphasis was to teach students how to apply
the law to public policy, but the courses they recommended spoke to a far ranging set of  issues.
46 Cited in George Ritzer. 1988. Sociological Theory. New
York: Knopf: 487.
47 Henri Giroux. 1988. “Postmodernism and the Discourse of
Educational Criticism.” Journal of  Education. 170 (3): 5.
48 Christopher Columbus Langdell was the first Dean of
Harvard Law School, and was responsible for
introducing the case law method of instruction. The
method was notable for its attempt to discern abstract
rules and doctrines from a set of appellate cases that
would enable students and practitioners to approach the
study of law as a science. 
49 Laura Appleman. 2005. “The Rise of  the Modern
American Law School: How Professionalism, German
Scholarship, and Legal Reform Shaped Our System of
Legal Education.” New England Law Rev. 39: 254.
50 Ronald Chester. 1993. “Reshaping First-year Legal
Doctrine: The Experience in the Law Schools,” 20 Fla.
St. U.L. Rev. 599: 603.
51 Harold Laswell and Myres McDougal. 1943. “Legal
Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in
the Public Interest.” 52 Yale L.J. 203.
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Titles for their courses included: “Law and Control,” “Law and Intelligence,” Law and
Distribution,” “Law and Community Development.”52 Each course raised questions about the
impact of  the law on daily life, democracy and power, matters of  respect, resource utilization, and
the like. In short, theirs was an attempt to generate a counter-hegemonic juridic discourse that
would alert students to the political and ideological uses to which law was frequently put. The
intervening years, however, have witnessed no appreciable attempt to establish a counter-hegemonic
juridic discourse as part of  American law school curricula. The reason, I would argue, that there has
been no curricular change is due to the dominant cultural interest in retaining hegemonic political
and ideological viewpoints consistent with the preservation of  advanced capitalist social relations.
One way this is accomplished is through the proliferation of  law as a master discourse.
The discourse of  the master, one of  Lacan’s four discourses,53 signifies life-long socialization to the
truth claims, core assumptions, and ideological symbols of  dominant culture.54 The discourse of  the
master commands allegiance to its authoritative voice, it is despotic.55 With respect to the law, the
master discourse is “positive law as associated with the ideas of  H.L.A. Hart… The person (or
institution) that engages in positive law is a master signifier in the Lacanian sense. The addresser is she
who determines the application of  the law to the issue at hand by applying the Hartian secondary
rules of  changing (creating), recognizing, and adjucating the law.”56 In Lacan’s schema, the discourse
of  the master signifies a unidirectional transmission of  information to be received by subjects. The
second of  Lacan’s discourses, the discourse of  the university, signifies the knowledge, reason, or
expertise being transmitted.57 For our purposes the discourse of  the master can be viewed as
representing the authoritative voice of  law school faculty, and the American Bar Association.58 The
discourse of  the university is signified in the law school curriculum. Put simply, the discourse of  the
university consists of  law as a body of  knowledge.59 Most important, the “discourse of  the university
can serve as a sophisticated way of  making the master’s claims to brute power more palatable through
veiling.”60 In short, for Lacan the university discourse is meant to rationalize the motives of  the
master, something that Schroeder would contend is “hardly news.”61 But to firmly establish her
point, Schroeder contends that even Left-wing law professors and students share in the reproduction
of  the master narrative because they work within a single dominant paradigm, and that even the
Critical Legal Studies movement operated within the dominant narrative, thereby legitimating it.62
52 Id at 256–261.
53 Jacques Lacan. 1991. L’Envers de la Psychanalyse.
Parais, France: Editions du Seuil. The four discourses
are: the discourse of the master, the discourse of the
university, the discourse of the hysteric, and the
discourse of the analyst.
54 Stuart Henry and Dragon Milovanovic. 1996.
Constitutive Criminology: Beyond Postmodernism.
London: Sage: 30. 
55 Christopher Robert McMahon. “Hysterical Academies:
Lacan’s Theory of  the Four Discourses.”
http://www.educ.utas.edu.au/users/tle/JOURNAL/Ar
ticles/McMahon/McMahon.html: 6.
56 Jeanne L. Schroeder. 2000–2001. “The Four Discourses
of  Law: A Lacanian Analysis of  Legal Practice and
Scholarship.” 79 Tex. L. Rev. 15: 47.
57 Id et 54.
58 While not a Lacanian, Pierre Bourdieu makes a similar
point with respect to juridical language. According to
Bourdieu, juridical language “bears all the marks of a
rhetoric of impersonality and of neutrality.” The result
is to produce “syntactic traits such as the predominance
of passive and impersonal constructions. These are
designed to mark the impersonality of normative
utterances and to establish the speaker as universal
subject, at once impartial and objective.” Pierre
Bourdieu. 1987. “The Force of  Law: Toward a
Sociology of  the Juridical Field.” 38 Hastings L.J. 820. 
59 Supra note 55 at 31–32.
60 See Schroeder op cit note 56 at 55.
61 Id at 60.
62 Id.
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The receivers of  information, our law school students, are what Lacan referred to as divided or
fading subjects. That is, there is always a “left out,” or that which is unspoken or marginalized in
discourse. The “left out” manifests in at least two ways. First, it manifests as the inability of
subjects to challenge the deliverer of  the master discourse presented as the authoritative voice of
the law. Law school faculty disseminate jurisprudence to subjects dialogically positioned as inferior
to the master. The second way that the “left out” manifests in discourse is through the
marginalization of  the “other” in the construction of  juridic events. The discourse of  the
university constructs “defendants” as divided subjects based on definitions of  illegality in the law.
Definitions of  themselves, their lifeworld experiences, and the like, must comport with the
ideologically constructed framework of  the law. Similarly, law school students may find that their
experiences are marginalized in juridic discourse, thereby serving to generate what Lacan referred
to as the “not all,” the experience of  being psychologically and emotionally divided. 
The psycho-emotional effects for American law school students and practitioners are real and
dramatic. Ogloff  et al. address “Problems Arising From Law School.” Among the most prevalent
are: high levels of  stress leading to alienation and dissatisfaction; substance use and abuse; suicide
among law students; and psychological problems.63
According to Krieger, lawyers “have the highest incidence of  depression of  any occupation in the
United States,” and “suffer other forms of  emotional distress up to 15 times more frequently than
the general population.”64 Krieger attributes this in part to misplaced values that students first
encounter in law school. For example, “values like money, power, and an uncompromising drive to
win are displacing values like integrity, decency, and mutuality among many lawyers.”65 These
misplaced values speak to a failure on the part of  law schools to inculcate students with a properly
articulated professionalism. Krieger’s own analysis of  the psycho-emotional effects of  law school
confirm earlier studies indicating that law school students who are “depressed or unhappy in the
first year … remained so throughout law school.”66 He attributes these results to the competitive
nature of  law school and the values and motives it generates. Moreover, Krieger’s data indicates
that “despite any efforts at these law schools to teach professionalism in the classroom,
orientations, workshops, or other typical formats, the overall law school experience is likely to
have an undermining effect on professionalism and career/life satisfaction.”67 Sadly, Krieger
concludes by suggesting that the law school experience transforms the entering law school student
into a very different person from the time they begin their studies to the time the complete them.
In short, “they become more depressed, less service-centered, and more inclined toward
undesirable, superficial goals and values.”68 To remedy the problem associated with constructing
divided subjects law schools should generate a “framework for analyzing discursive formations
which renders the human subject polycentered and polyvocal, where subjects find an abundance
of  discursive formations within which to embody desire to construct self, others, and society.”69
63 James R. P. Ogloff, David R. Lyon, Kevin S. Douglas,
and V. Gordon Rose. 2000. “Annual Nebraska Survey
& Survey of  Legal Education: Article More than
“Learning To Think Like A Lawyer:” The Empirical
Research on Legal Education.” 34 Creighton L. Rev. 73.
64 Lawrence Krieger. 2005. “The Inseparability of
Professionalism and Personal Satisfaction: Or Why the
Wrong Values Will Mess Up Your Life.” 11 Clinical L.
Rev. 427. 
65 Id at 427.
66 Id at 426. 
67 Id at 434.
68 Id at 434.
69 Supra note 55 at 34. 
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Application of  a postmodern analysis inspired and informed by Lacan’s four discourses to
assessment of  contemporary law school pedagogy is especially provocative and insightful. When
conceived as the discourse of  the master, law school pedagogy situates law school faculty as the
“master and producer of  knowledge as power demanding the recognition of  his [sic] autonomy at
the expense of  the perversity of  students’ desire.”70 For the master, education “involves an
initiation through pain that thereby ‘civilizes’ the desire of  students who would otherwise remain
feral.”71 For their part, students are expected to demonstrate noticeable appreciation of  the
knowledge and power of  the master, and to sublimate their desire to challenge or refute the
master’s knowledge. It is in this way that the discourse of  the Master is the ‘Tyranny of  the all-
knowing and exclusion of  fantasy [where we experience] the retreat of  subjectivity.72” The basic
law school experience, argues Kennedy, is a “double surrender: to a passivizing classroom
experience and to a passive attitude toward the content of  the legal system.”73 For example, in his
juxtaposition of  “cold” and “hot” cases, Kennedy describes the typical first year law school
experience as one where students are generally presented with cold cases that are “technical,
boring, difficult, [and] obscure legal cases,”74 along with hot cases that are more factually
interesting and constituted by moral and ethical questions of  significance, and where judicial
decisions are so outrageous that students are compelled to passionately argue. Unfortunately,
argues Kennedy, there is little patience in law school pedagogy for passionate argument. In fact,
students who are driven by moral and ethical concerns to address the key facts raised in hot cases
risk isolation. This is partly due to the fact that the master narrative is designed and administered
to delegitimate passionate or emotive responses opting instead for a dispassionate, rational
approach. What is needed, argues Kennedy, “is to think about law in a way that will allow one to
enter into it, to criticize it without utterly rejecting it, and to manipulate it without self-
abandonment to their [the student’s] system of  thinking and doing.”75 Furthermore, Metz
contends that “Law professors, acting as vigilant guardians of  the established legal order, patrol the
“borders” of  these patterns of  permissible and impermissible subjects, these privileged forms of
rule-based and analogical reasoning,” with the resulting effect being “the voices actually heard and
silenced in the classroom also reproduce these patterns, forms, and indifferences.”76 It is in this way
that students themselves contribute to their own subjugation in law classrooms. 
In Lacan’s schema, the discourse of  the master is juxtaposed to the unsettling rhizomatic discourse
of  the hysteric, the student [and sometimes faculty member] who refuses to bend to the will of  the
discourse of  the master or of  the university. The discourse of  the hysteric is “the challenge to or
critique of  the other discourses.” It is the discourse of  the interrogator.77
Students who speak through the discourse of  the hysteric are more likely to challenge conventional
university discourses to engage in real experiential education. These students are divided subjects
who recognize and act on what they perceive to be the “left out” in juridic discourse. For
Schroeder, following Zizek, the hysteric “constantly asks the Big Other, “Che voui,?” “What do
70 Supra note 40 at 7.
71 Id.
72 Rose and Mitchell, cited in supra note 40 at 8.
73 Duncan Kennedy. 1998. “Legal Education as Training
for Hierarchy.” In D. Kairys (ed) The Politics of  Law.
New York: Perseus Books 54–75: 57.
74 Id at 57–58.
75 Id at 62.
76 Brook K. Baker. 2000. “Language Acculturation
Processes and Resistance To In “Doctrin” Ation in the
Legal Skills Curriculum and Beyond: A Commentary on
Mertz’s Critical Anthropology of  the Socratic,
Doctrinal Classroom.” 34 J. Marshall L. Rev. 131: 137.
77 See Schroeder op cit note 56 at 72.
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you want (i.e., from me)?” “What do I lack?,” “Just tell me what I need to do, to say, to be, in order
that you will desire me back – recognize me as a speaking subject.”78 According to McMahon,
“hysterical” law school students would raise questions that are “unrealistic, paranoid, delusional,
hypochondriac, unstable, fluxatious, [and] troublesome.” Moreover, and most important as it
pertains to quality experiential law school education, “hysteria violates textual and disciplinary
codes, rules, conventions, modes of  production, technologies of  knowledge, discursive bounds or
limits.”79 In short, the hysterical student (in Lacanian terms) is potentially subversive. Through
hysterical discourse, the subject will learn about what it is that she lacks and must procure in order
to become a part of  dominant culture. She will also learn what is lacking in dominant culture,
thereby allowing her to challenge the methods of  law school pedagogy with its emphasis on
competition, gender, ethnicity, and class marginalization, rote memorization, mind-numbing
lecture, and status quo curricula. She will challenge the law school to generate a real-world
experiential education that includes lively dialogue among students and faculty who, rather than
approach texts as gospel, will engage them with new ideas and fresh perspectives. She will demand
that law school faculty make the materials politically, economically, and culturally relevant. She
will resist efforts on behalf  of  law school faculty to quell passionate articulation of  key moral and
ethical issues arising in hot cases. To conclude, “the hysteric’s discourse enables us to identify how
the substantive content that has been excluded from the law serves to harm the subjects subjected
to the law.”80
As dogmatism wanes, a counter-hegemonic creativity with regard to problem-solving becomes the
primary emphasis. If  properly applied Lacan’s four discourses can enable us to understand why law
school pedagogy operates as it does, and can open up new ways to approach it. 
If  adopted, a postmodern and Lacanian-inspired law school pedagogy would appear dramatically
different. Following Girioux, this is because a postmodern emphasis 
refuses forms of  knowledge and pedagogy wrapped in the legitimizing discourse of  the sacred and
the priestly, its rejection of  universal reason as a foundation for human affairs, its claim that all
narratives are partial, and its call to perform a critical reading on all scientific, cultural, and social
texts as historical and political constructions provide the pedagogical grounds for radicalizing the
emancipatory possibilities of  teaching and learning as part of  a wider struggle for democratic
public life and critical citizenship.81
Long ago, American Pragmatist, John Dewey, made the prescient observation that much of  what
passed for pedagogy in the United States was really a matter of  infusing teachers with the authority
necessary to effectively establish control over classroom content and behavior. For it was clear to
Dewey that entering a classroom as an “individual” would not be enough to generate the aura of
expertise necessary to legitimate the teacher as expert. The teacher needed to enter the classroom
wearing the cloak of  authority. Or as Dewey suggested, “They clothe themselves with some
tradition as a mantle, and henceforth it is not just “I” who speaks, but some Lord speaks through
me. The teacher then offers himself  [sic] as the organ of  the voice of  a whole school, of  a finished
classic tradition, and arrogates to himself  [sic] the prestige that comes from what he [sic] is the
spokesman for.”82 American law schools approach pedagogy in much the same way and have done
78 Id at 56: 82–83.
79 Supra note 40 at 10.
80 Schroeder op cit note 56 at 86.
81 Supra note 47 at 26.
82 Joseph Ratner. 1939. Intelligence in the Modern World:
John Dewey’s Philosophy. New York, Modern Library:
623.
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so for more than a century. Whether they are aware of  it or not, contemporary law school faculty
continue to channel the pedagogical method established by the law school “Lord,” Christopher
Columbus Langdell, and his emphasis on learning to become a lawyer through case analysis,
memorization, and intensive competition. Through references to the Lacanian discourse of  the
university appearing as canonical texts, statutes, cases, and rules (each of  which is likely to be
foreign to most of  the students in the room) the teacher’s cloak, a master discourse, immediately
identifies her as part of  a tradition of  jurisprudential thought and the authority standing before
them. Still, questions may be raised regarding whether there is a real problem with a curriculum
designed in this way. For some, they may be wondering, “so what?” 
The answer to the question, “So what?,” was provided by Dewey who was among the first to
identify what contemporary social scientific scholars have subsequently written volumes about,
that “Suppression of  the emotional and intellectual integrity of  the pupil is the result [of  an
authoritarian pedagogy]; their freedom is repressed and the growth of  their own personalities
stunted.”83 Rather than an emphasis on the creation of  hierarchy leading to docility in the
classroom, the teacher must use the skills at her disposal to steer students toward “the conditions
that arouse curiosity.”84 For Dewey, as would be the case for many generations of  future
pedagogues, including a now well established clinical legal pedagogy, the way to true knowledge was
through experiential education that is informed by the need for a polycentered, polyvocal
discourse. 
“Education” Is An Empty Signifier: Social Reproduction
As a concept, “education” is an empty signifier, meaningless without explication. And while
politicians, media analysts, and education activists commonly extol the virtues of  “quality
education,” seldom is an effort made to operationalize what is meant by the concept. Perhaps it is
presumed that when one speaks of  education it is apparent what is meant. But as with all
hegemonic institutions, political and ideological influence generates a popular sense of  the “matter
of  fact” to the point where there doesn’t appear to be a need for further explanation. It is this
aspect of  education that imparts to it its greatest hegemonic authority. Law school pedagogy has
been notoriously bereft of  theoretical articulation of  the goals to be achieved, the issues to be
addressed, and the best practices for developing legal practitioners skilled at avoiding what
Schopenhauer referred to as the “eddies of  misunderstanding.”85 Lamenting the dearth of
theorizing about law school clinical pedagogy has been ongoing since the 1970s,86 and continues to
the present.87
83 Id at 623. This is precisely the point made by Rose and
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88 Originally coined by C.Wright Mills, the sociological
imagination requires people to understand social
structures in order to gain greater insight into how their
personal lives are affected by them. Mills also stressed
the need to place our experience in historical context to
better understand who we are. As such, the purpose of
sociology is to understand how society works, especially
with regard to group behavior. Most important for our
purposes is that the sociologist refuses to accept
common sense notions of how society works, but rather,
seeks to unearth underlying forces that give shape to
contemporary institutions. By way of metaphor,
sociologists would generally agree to the following:
“Most of us are danced by strings about which we are
unaware, and over which we have no control.” To expose
these strings is our sociological mandate. Moreover, the
argument I am making here suggests that the
educational experience signifies one of the key strings
influencing every American. See P. Worsley. 1992. The
New Introducing Sociology. London: Penguin; C.
Wright Mills. Mills, C. W.: 1959, The Sociological
Imagination, London: Oxford. 
89 E. Fromm. 1941. Escape From Freedom. New York:
Holt, Rhinehart and Winston: 286. 
90 Id at 286.
91 Michael Apple. 1990. Ideology and Curriculum. New
York: Routledge: 1.
92 Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis. 1976. Schooling in
Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the
Contradictions of  Economic Life. New York: Basic
Books. 
93 It is important to recognize that the opposite is also true.
The educational experiences of upper middle class
students prepare them to adopt roles of political,
economic, and cultural responsibility that are typically
unavailable to working class students. Pedagogical styles
typically privilege intellectual freedom, questioning,
exploration, and the like. 
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Sociological inquiry mandates avoiding easy prima faci understanding of  important institutions
and concepts. To fully understand institutions means adopting a sociological imagination.88 By
adopting the sociological imagination we are better positioned to commence our examination of
education and its effects on who we are and what we become. “In the first place,” suggests Eric
Fromm, “we should ask ourselves what we mean by education.”89 For Fromm, the purpose of
education in every society is to prepare its youth to assume roles later in life. Most important,
education should “mold his [sic] character, that his [sic] desires coincide with the necessities of  his
[sic] social role.”90 For theorist Michael Apple, “education was not a neutral enterprise, that by the
very nature of  the institution, the educator was involved, whether conscious of  it or not, in a
political act.”91 For Bowles and Gintis,92 schooling in capitalist America replicates the structural
conditions and role expectations necessary to prepare a large percentage of  youth for working class
jobs. Classrooms in working class communities are structured in such a way that they resemble the
power relations that await working class youth upon graduation from high school. Rows of  desks
are neatly arranged in striated space to face the front of  the classroom. Students must raise their
hands before speaking (or going to the bathroom, or doing anything else that is not explicitly
recognized as being part of  the scripted classroom performance). Teachers signify future bosses
who demonstrate to youth that their opinion is the only one of  consequence, and any indiscretion
will produce serious sanctions. These are lessons that working class students must learn if  they are
to survive in the authoritative and often capricious world of  working class jobs.93 In short, for
Bowles and Gintis teaching and education are clearly political acts. While Bowles and Gintis
stimulated considerable debate among sociologists and education experts, their theory was
criticized as a too narrow economic determinism that did not allow for variations in teachers,
school districts, and students’ efforts to challenge more conventional pedagogy. Still, as an
explanation for social reproduction of  class positions their work continues to resonate as one
possible explanation among a complex set of  institutional practices. Embellishing on the Bowles
and Gintis model, but avoiding its economic determinism, was French sociologist, Pierre
Bourdieu. 
Like Bowles and Gintis, Bourdieu identified education as the prevailing institution responsible for
social reproduction. According to Bourdieu, cultural capital and habitus combine to assure
cultural reproduction of  one generation after another.94 Cultural capital is the background,
knowledge and skills accumulated during a lifetime. Like financial capital, cultural capital is
parlayed in political, economic, and cultural environments to procure access to power, position,
status, and the like. Language, humor, taste, wit, art, literature, food, clothing, each is suggestive of
one’s accumulated cultural capital. Related to cultural capital is habitus. In order to generate a
reflexive sense of  who we are in relation to others each of  us internalizes our lifeworld experiences,
that is, our expectations, aspirations, attitudes, and beliefs. These are what constitute our habitus.
Students exposed to those kinds of  cultural capital most valued by dominant culture are likely to
have a significant cultural advantage relative to those who are not. Together, cultural capital and
habitus significantly influence our educational experiences. For Bourdieu, students emanating
from culturally devalued class backgrounds experience education as a form of  symbolic violence.
Unlike the more privileged student, working class and poor students, female students, gay and
lesbian students, and ethnic minority students tend not to learn much about their experiences, or
people who are like them, from their textbooks or classroom lectures. Rather, by way of  omission,
their experiences are marginalized and thereby devalued. It’s not that textbooks berate students
with working class backgrounds, the reproduction techniques are far more subtle than that. Rather,
they simply ignore them, their parents, their grandparents, their contributions to history, and so
on. They are not present for students to recognize, take pride in, or even to criticize. They simply
vanish from history. In short, education works to reproduce cultural stratification by valuing
dominant cultural capital and marginalizing all others.95 Mertz speaks directly to this point with
respect to law school pedagogy.96 As if  citing directly from Bourdieu, Mertz contends that “If
students of  color and female students tend to be more silent in these [law school] classrooms, then
any differences these students bring with them in experience or background are not given voice in
classroom discourse. To the extent that these differences in experience reflect race, gender, class, or
other aspects of  social identity, we again see aspects of  social structure and difference pushed to
the margins of  legal discourse.”
In what was a major contribution to the social reproduction literature, Jay MacLeod argued that
when faced with the overwhelming weight of  poverty, and class and race/ethnic bias, youth in a low
income Chicago housing project leveled their aspirations,97 decidedly acting to withdrawal their
94 Pierre Bourdieu and Jean Claude Passeron. 1977.
Reproduction in Education, Society, and Culture.
London: Sage. 
95 Bourdieu applies his theorization of habitus and social
reproduction to juridical fields. See supra note 56 at
805.
96 Elizabeth Mertz. 2000. “Teaching Lawyers the
Language of  Law: Legal and Anthropological
Translations.” 34 J. Marshall L. Rev. 91, 112.
97 MacLeod’s recognition of the dialectical interplay
between structurally imposed obstacles to success, and
his subjects’ active participation in psycho-emotionally
withdrawing from normative expectations regarding
upward mobility and the preparation needed to lay the
foundation for it, make his a compelling analysis. With
the privileging of “leveled aspirations” MacLeod builds
upon the path-breaking work of Paul Willis who, in his
1977 publication of Learning to Labor, identified a
similar pattern among working class white youth in
England. In each case the author’s avoid easy linear
explanations for social reproduction as imposed
through education by revealing the active role played by
the students themselves in the construction of a dialogic
relationship with teachers, principals, and parents
toward a negotiated rendering of the meaning of
“education.” In each analysis it becomes clear that the
students are not naïve about what is happening to them,
they understand it well. They are under no illusions that
they will in any way benefit from the kind of education
being imposed on them. So, they level their aspirations
in order to cope with the twin pressures squeezing them
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commitment to education and any idea of  occupational success.98 With great clarity, and what
some may consider pragmatism, MacLeod’s white subjects, the Hallway Hangers, had no illusions
about the life that awaited them. Everyone they knew – extended and immediate family, friends,
and neighbors – had lived the same basic life of  poverty for as long as anyone could remember.
What was the point of  deferring gratification long enough to complete high school? Education
beyond high school was out of  the question. These youth had thoroughly internalized their habitus
in such a way that when confronted with the requirements and promise of  a completed high school
education they rebelled. For black youth, The Brothers, the experience was initially different. As
the first generation of  young black students born to parents who experienced the successes of  the
1960s Civil Rights Movement, their lifeworld was constituted by stories of  hard work,
commitment to social change, improving race/ethnic relationships, and the promise of  upward
mobility. Initially, then, despite their devalued cultural capital and overt structural barriers, The
Brothers were far more hopeful than the Hallway Hangers that things for them would be different.
In a more recently published edition, MacLeod writes of  revisiting the housing project to check up
on the Hallway Hangers and the Brothers.99 What he found was that, predictably, the Hallway
Hangers continued to struggle with a life of  poverty. To his surprise, however, he also found The
Brothers to have adopted far more critical attitudes toward upward mobility and life chances than
he had witnessed in his initial set of  interviews. Why? They were shocked to experience structural
obstacles to their opportunity to succeed, obstacles that they identified as both race/ethnically and
class based. 
To wit, education is political, and education is ideological. Regardless of  the level (K-12,
undergraduate and graduate), education is a hegemonic institution crafted to reproduce dominant
political, economic and cultural relations. Law schools, according to Kennedy, are “intensely
political places.”100 Despite the apparent “trade school mentality,” and attention to “trees at the
expense of  forests,” Kennedy is most concerned that the hidden component of  law school is
“ideological training for willing service in the hierarchies of  the corporate welfare state.”101 Law
school is a system reproducing steering mechanism whose curriculum and teaching methods are
designed to generate institutional actors who advance the interests of  the powerful. 
In a provocative underground article by Jerry Farber in the late 1960s,102 the educational
experience for most students in the United States appears analogous to Foucault’s articulation of
the institutional machinery designated to create docile bodies.103 For Farber, as for Foucault,
(97 cont.)  from below and above – their family and its
class position, as well as their race/ethnic
composition, and structural impediments to upward
mobility. See Paul Willis. 1977. Learning to Labor:
How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs.
New York: Columbia University Press. 
98 Jay MacLeod. 1987. Ain’t No Makin’ It: Leveled
Aspirations in a Low-Income Neighborhood. Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press. 
99 Id at: 155–236. 
100 Supra note 67 at 54.
101 Id 73.
102 J. Farber. 1968. Student as Nigger. Los Angeles 
Free Press. http://www.soilandhealth.org/0303critic
/030301studentasnigger.html: 1–19.
103 M. Foucault. 1977. Discipline and Punish: The Birth
of  the Prison. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York:
Vintage. More will be said about the generation of
docility later on this essay. Briefly, for Foucault,
recognition of a new “political anatomy” beginning in
the 18th century led to numerous innovations in many
dominant institutions across Europe to promote a
technology of control. Political anatomony refers to
recognition of the myriad ways human beings can be
controlled if their bodies can be manipulated by agents
representing hegemonic powers. Foucault suggests that
“a body is docile that may be subjected, used,
transformed and improved” (136). Foucault’s
discussion of the institutional manufacture of docile
bodies emphasizes primary and secondary schooling.
Achieving the necessary discipline leading to docility
required structural confinement, what Foucault
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dominant cultural institutions like education “teach you by pushing you around, by stealing your
will and your sense of  power, by making timid square apathetic slaves out of  you – authority
addicts.”104 How is this accomplished? For Farber, and for the dominant thinking surrounding the
scholarship of  critical pedagogy from the 1970s on, the message is in the method. Regardless of
the substantive area being taught, what matters most with regard to establishing and maintaining
control over students is the method of  instruction used. Beginning in kindergarten and continuing
throughout a student’s educational experience, the method of  instruction and the physical nature
of  the classroom conspire to produce docility and submissiveness, and above all a pathological
commitment to please authorities.105 This extensive socialization period generates a strong desire
on behalf  of  students to be told what to do. Eighteen or more years of  persistent emphasis on rule-
following effectively generates docile bodies with a strong desire to please, but terribly ill prepared
to take responsibility for their own ideas. So when we receive students into the academy as
Masters, Ph.D, and JD candidates, why are we surprised when they tend to demonstrate little in the
way of  initiative regarding their own learning. By this time in their academic careers students tend
to be mercenary about the work and its potential pay-off. Graduates of  higher education are
technically skilled and intelligent enough to competently address the challenges they face. They are,
however, ill equipped with enough fortitude or initiative to question in myriad ways, and for a
hundred good reasons, the efficacy of  their assignments.106
Law schools condition students through participation in a set of  rituals designed to enhance
performance and competition.107 In this way, students participate in the complex set of
relationships that come to socialize them into the profession. In the United States, the success
narrative commences with consideration of  law school admission. Peak performance on the Law
School Admissions Test (LSAT) is imperative for entrance to all law schools, with only the “best”
students acquiring consideration from the top law schools.108 Whether students are driven by a
desire to improve the administration of  justice, or by the competition, status, and eventual
financial security that may accrue, each must participate in a shared experience of  examinations,
the pursuit of  law review and clerkships, and job searches.109 In doing so, students participate in
their own subjugation to the “cultural understandings of  success and the formal and informal
metrics that communicate those values.”110 But how could it be otherwise? The success narrative
“constrains and structures every aspect of  law school activity.”111
(103 cont.)  referred to as a “protected place of
disciplinary monotony” (141). Institutions charged with
delivering primary and secondary education are
referred to as “discreet, but insidious and effective”
(141). They are effective in the sense that they
manipulate bodies to the point where they are more
predictably malleable, easier to control. 
104 Supra note 91 at 4.
105 Id at 6. See also, S. Bowles and H. Gintis. 1976.
Schooling in Capitalist America. New York: Basic
Books. 
106 This is a recurring them for Farber. See supra 91.
107 Supra note 91 at 13.
108 The LSAT examination serves as the primary obstacle
for entrance to most quality law schools. The
procedure itself can be cumbersome. Applicants must
prepare themselves for a four-hour test addressing
Logical Reasoning, Analytical Reasoning, and Reading
Comprehension. The test produces a scale from 120 –
180, with 180 being the highest possible score. Upon
arrival on testing day, students will be fingerprinted,
and they will write a “Certifying Statement” attesting
to their authenticity as a test taker. In short, the LSAT
examination presents a physical, psychological,
intellectual, and emotional test. Since so much is
riding on successful completion of the test, to prepare,
many students will enroll in LSAT preparation courses
that can cost as much as $3,000.00. In short, these
students commence the process of competition and
willing capitulation to the authority derived from law
school admission before they ever enter the front door. 
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Human, ed. by Rainer Funk, New York
(Continuum) 1994, pp. 99–105. http://www.erich-
fromm.de/e/index.htm
113 Id.
114 Supra note 91 at 11.
115 Supra note 73 at 62.
116 See Schroeder Supra note 56 at 62.
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It is in this way that education can be engineered in the service of  necrophily – a regressive human
quality that seeks the “suspension of  growth” through continuous mind-numbing repetition and
adherence to structures of  authority, and an associated avoidance of  boundary testing.112
Constituted by sempiternal psycho-emotional dissonance caused by progressive and regressive
impulses that both stimulate and inhibit “man’s search for meaning” and clearer understanding of
subjective identity, human beings driven by power and the need for control as a way to satisfy their
desire for self-awareness turn to necrophilia, narcissism, and what Fromm refers to as incestuous
symbiosis. Since his articulation of  necrophilia is what is most apropos of  our experience with
education I’ll focus only on it. Fromm suggests that,
By necrophilia is meant love for all that is violence and destruction; the desire to kill; the
worship of  force; attraction to death, to suicide, to sadism; the desire to transform the organic
into the inorganic by means of  order. The necrophile, lacking the necessary qualities to
create, in his impotence finds it easy to destroy because for him it serves only one quality:
force.113
Students’ survival skills are well honed by the time they enter graduate school. They know what to
do and say in order to “get by,” to “get the grades,” or “to impress that special faculty member”
who in some measure can generate the prized grant-funded research, or serve as the conduit for a
summer externship. In short, “there is very little shit he [sic] will not eat if  there is something to
be gained by it.”114 For most students it is the dank suffocating irrelevance of  contemporary
American education, including legal education, that is indicative of  its necrophilia. An obsessive
adoration of  the status quo squeezes pedagogical and dialogic relationships into a narrow corridor
framed by an overly excessive commitment to order, authority, control, teaching to the test,
teaching to the Bar, narrowness of  mind, and docility. Their education is irrelevant, not because
they are disinterested in learning about the world, about their area of  substantive interest, about
themselves. If  left to their own devices these would be the issues and ideas that would likely matter
most to students. No, education is irrelevant because it fails to engage students in a dialogical
process that leads them to real understanding of  the world around them, their substantive interest,
and themselves. 
Law school education is necrophilic. While the skills that law school students learn are important
(rules, issue spotting, case analysis, case holdings, etc.), they are instrumental, technical skills
presented to students via a master narrative that presumes priestly omnipotence. Legal rules and
holdings, we are to believe, are the product of  legal reasoning, rational thought, the science of  law.
This is inherently problematic because, as Kennedy suggests, “rights discourse is internally
inconsistent, vacuous, and circular.”115 It’s not that discussion of  rights is the problem, but by
discussing them in the context of  a master narrative means that to “speak of  rights is precisely not
to speak of  justice between classes, races, or sexes.116 Moreover, these skills are taught through rote
memorization in the static classroom setting devoid of  messy real-world experience. 
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Education is a commodity like any other found in a capitalist state. In order for a commodity to
be valuable it must also be subjected to measurable quantifiable scrutiny. Michael Apple’s analysis
of  education reform movements in both the United States and the UK suggests that the
management of  education has given way to a market driven ideology. This has led to the position
that “only that which is measurable is important,” or what Apple refers to as an “audit culture.”117
The effects of  the auditing or what could really be referred to as an actuarial model of  education
are significant insofar as they generate a “remarkably rapid erosion of  democratically determined
collective values and institutions.”118 Transitioning all aspects of  dominant culture into market-
based economic analysis denigrates civil society by channeling our lifeworld experiences, dreams,
and desires into an economic logic governed by “market realities and relations.”119 In short, an
audit culture devalues public goods and services like those that potentially may emerge through
quality education. Finally, Apple suggests that those administrators responsible for implementing
the new auditing approach to education see themselves as “moral crusaders” who are “endlessly
responsive to ‘clients’ and ‘consumers’ in such a way that they are participating in the creation of
a newly reconstituted and more efficient set of  institutions that will ‘help everyone’….”120 Most
important as it applies to my argument here is the fact that a vigorous competition for credentialing
has emerged as part of  this process. Stratification via credentialing is beneficial to this new class of
academics and managers because it legitimates their place as purveyors of  knowledge. But it also
means that “the return of  high levels of  mandatory standardization, more testing more often, and
constant auditing of  results also provides mechanisms – an insistent logic – that enhance the
chances that the children of  the professional and managerial new middle class will have less
competition from other students.”121 It is in his analysis of  education’s transition to auditing that
Apple joins Bowles and Gintis in their economic analysis of  the social reproduction mandate of
education.
III. Student Development Theory And Experiential Education
An alternative to conventional law school pedagogy as a way of  teaching students how to prepare
for the practice of  law has emerged over the last century in the form of  legal clinics. Because this is
a now well-established literature I will not repeat it here.122 Besides, it is my contention that (and
this is borne out by the hundreds of  articles written over the last decade addressing the subject of
clinical legal studies) without substantive changes to the now well ingrained law school pedagogy,
legal clinics and the philosophical and pedagogical epistemology that guide them will continue to
operate as appendages to more mainstream politically and ideologically driven pedagogy. As such,
their relegation to marginalized status in law schools means that live client clinics, including
innocence project clinics, while offering a glimmer of  dialogical praxis, signify but a ghettoized
version of  it. In short, the three articles mentioned in the first section of  this paper that make the
strong claim for the value of  live client innocence projects, while noteworthy in their substance and 
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Tenn. L. Rev. 939. Rose Voyvodic. 2001.
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commitment to quality experiential education, are, without dramatic alterations to contemporary
pedagogical practices, unlikely to succeed in the way the authors intend. It appears that advocates
of  law school clinics who recognize that there are serious flaws in contemporary pedagogy with
regard to preparing students to actually practice law have attempted to graft on to conventional
practices a critical heuristic device to at least provide some exposure to real world problems that
students are likely to encounter upon graduation. And while laudable in their effort, because the
dominant political and ideological driving force behind what constitutes legal pedagogy is the
perpetuation of  intense competition, exclusion, elitism, and a positivist commitment to viewing
law as a science,123 the effect of  clinical programs to emphasize an ethic of  care and hope is likely
to be minimal. By way of  juxtaposition, clinical legal education may bring in to sharper focus the
question of  whether law is more like science, or like art.124 It may raise questions about whether
doctrinal principles taught by careful reading of  appellate materials (Langdellian method) should
be the preferred method for preparing practicing lawyers, or whether a method more closely
aligned with medical school pedagogy,125 or one that approximates graduate studies in the social
sciences is more efficacious.126 To truly generate a critical legal pedagogy will require
implementation of  a non-linear, dialogical pedagogy that privileges experiential education where the
dominant philosophical and pedagogical emphasis is to expose students to their responsibility for
improving the quality of  life of  those around them. 
The structural limitations imposed on law school clinicians tend to generate a clinical pedagogy based
on experiential learning. Learning , argues Moliterno, can happen anywhere and does not require
123 While I stand by the suggestion that the contemporary
law school curriculum as implemented in most US law
schools is consistent with this description, there are
law schools, and law school faculty, who readily
acknowledge a more nuanced approach to the study of
law. One very recent example is the creation of the
University of California at Irvine School of Law. The
new Dean of this law school, Erwin Chemerinsky, has
sought to create a law school faculty constituted by
disciplinary diversity. For example, faculty have been
drawn from the social and behavioral sciences, and the
humanities. Such a move is indicative of a more
politically, economically, and culturally nuanced
approach to jurisprudence. 
124 Morris Bernstein. 1996. “Learning from Experience:
Montaigne, Jerome Frank and the Clinical Habit of
Mind.” 25 Cap. U.L. Rev. 517.
125 The medical school model has for a very long time
served as a beacon of pedagogical inspiration for
clinical legal scholars. With its emphasis on
combining analytical and experiential training, legal
scholars have argued that a version of the medical
school model may be well situated for adoption by law
schools to improve professional legal training. See
Jerome Frank. 1933. “Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-
School?” 81 U. PA. L. Rev. 907; Kandis Scott. 2006.
“Non-Analytical Thinking in Law Practice: Blinking
in the Forest.” 12 Clinical L. Rev. 687; James
Moliterno. 1996. “Legal Education, Experiential
Education, and Professional Responsibility.” 38 Wm
and Mary L. Rev. 71; Morris Bernstein. 1996.
“Learning from Experience: Montaign, Jerome Frank
and the Clinical Habit of  Mind.” 25 Cap. U.L. Rev.
517.
126 Graduate work in the social sciences is marked by small
seminar sessions of roughly fifteen students and a
faculty member where in-depth discussion of iconic
texts, contemporary scholarship, and data is the norm.
Students are encouraged to generate thoughtful
reflexive interpretations of each to come to
understanding of the current state of the discipline.
Typically, while instructors require students to correctly
understand the internal theoretical and conceptual
claims made by social scientists to make certain students
are clear about what the authors’ claims are, students
are encouraged to place social science scholarship in its
broader historical context. In short, students are
required to engage in dialogue with the authors of
leading scholarship and to generate interpretations of
that work based on the student’s knowledge of the
discipline, and their own subjective understanding of it.
Because of the influence of social psychology in the
early twentieth-century (and an awareness of the
contingent nature of identity construction), and later,
postmodern discourse analysis which challenged
modernist truth claims, social science faculty have been
influenced by a body of theory that encourages
approaches to texts as open for interpretation in a way
that law school faculty have been slower to adopt.
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teachers or mentors.127 What students need most is experiential education. By way of  contrast with
learning, education “consists of  a designed, managed, and guided experience.”128 Quality clinical
legal education should expose students to “the real impact of  the legal process upon members of
society; the vicissitudes of  poverty; the complexities between persons occupying various roles within
the lawyering process and; the values embedded in the legal process.”129 Citing the influence of
Dewey, Moliterno suggests that “experiential education proceeds through the process of  synthesis
[whereby] students are exposed to the theory of  an activity; they experience the activity; they reflect
on the relationship between the theory and the experience and synthesize the two; they form a new
or modified theory; they test it by experience, and so on.”130 Clinical mentoring programs, summer
jobs, unsupervised externships, moot court competitions, and participation on law reviews, for
example, do not generate education, but are clearly opportunities to learn.131 In place of  these
programs Moliterno suggests that what is needed is a three-year long simulated law practice. The
simulations will provide experiential education involving a wide variety of  thought processes
associated with activities other than the application of  law to facts. This simulation will cover the
ethics and law of  lawyering using a combination of  methodologies that address the same thought
processes addressed in the cases and materials courses, and the clinical courses.132
Despite his acknowledgement of  the decades of  improvements and innovations introduced by
simulation teaching and externships, and his forceful and well-argued recognition of  the need for
changes in legal education, Moliterno acknowledges that “no widespread, systematic connection
between experiential education and professional responsibility law teaching has occurred.”133
Moliterno’s recommendation that law schools implement a three-year simulated law practice is
reminiscent of  the apprenticeship model that predates academic training in the United States, but
with clear pedagogical differences. Law office apprenticeship was the prevailing method of  legal
education prior to the establishment of  the first university-based law schools. And while it may be
tempting to argue for a return to an apprenticeship model, there are sound pedagogical and
professional reasons for not doing so. The bulk of  my reasoning will appear in the next section, as
I attempt to describe a way forward that is based on insights drawn from dialogical method and
student development theory.
Kandis Scott articulates a creative vision for attaining experiential education, one that is similar to
Moliterno’s, but arrives at it using a different analytical frame constituted by non-linearity, chaos,
and rhizomes to make her case for the practical benefits of  non-analytical thinking in the practice
of  law.134 In challenging the modernist inspired positivist approaches to the study of  law, Scott
argues that because a client’s problems are often multivariate a “less logical approach that embraces
127 James E. Moliterno. 1996. “Legal Education,
Experiential Education, and Professional
Responsibility.” 38 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 71.
128 Id at 78. 
129 Rose Voyvodic. 2001. “Considerable Promise and
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Clinical Legal Education.” 20 Windsor Y.B. Access
Just.: 113.
130 Moliterno op cit note 127 at 81.
131 Id at 79.
132 Id at 76.
133 Id at 94. As with so many who write in the clinical
legal education tradition, Moliterno’s failure to
analyze the reasons why there has been no systematic
connection between experiential education and
professional responsibility law teaching despite a
century’s worth of scholarly acknowledgement of the
value of clinical and apprenticeship opportunities,
speaks to the limitations of legal scholarship regarding
this issue and has been the primary focus of this essay.
134 Kandis Scott. 2006. “Non-Analytical Thinking in
Law Practice: Blinking in the Forest.” 12 Clinical L.
Rev. 687.
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the complexity of  clients’ problems produces better results.”135 Following a postmodern line of
critique characteristic of  the work of  Deleuze and Guattari,136 Baudrillard,137 Derrida,138
Arrigo,139 Henry and Milovanovic,140 Schehr,141 Arrigo and Schehr,142 Schehr and Milovanovic,143
Arrigo, Milovanovic and Schehr,144 and Brion,145 Scott flirts around the edges with a now well
established attempt to understand social problems, especially socio-legal problems, using
affirmative postmodernism and chaos theory. In doing so (albeit incompletely), she argues that
“transient, shifting, disconcerting and ambiguous situations are the norm.”146 Given the non-
linearity of  most cases practitioners will encounter, Scott argues for a method of  legal education
that will prepare students to “understand the role of  intuition in legal representation.”147 Intuition,
argues Scott, is applied by the best legal minds when facing difficult cases and emerges
unconsciously based on a storehouse of  skills and experience honed over time. Intuition does not
arise from law school pedagogy, quite to the contrary, it emerges as a result of  active engagement
with case materials. In short, the typical Langdellian approach taken by law schools, one that
emphasizes logical processing of  statutes, rules, principles, propositions, and case law transmitted
through books will never generate the kind of  intuition necessary to effectively problem solve
actually existing irrational non-linear cases. Scott admits that there are many obstacles to teaching
students how to approach problems in a non-linear way that values intuition,148 and suggests that
more frequent opportunities for students and teachers to work on real cases and be informed by
multiple experiences is a good place to start. Scott’s method speaks to the heart of  dialogicality,
and can be improved by including community experts (police officers, prosecutors, public
defenders, judges, forensic scientists) as part of  the investigation process and/or training. 
While I share Scott’s emphasis on complexity and a rhizomatic approach to understanding
complicated problems, in making her point she replaces one essentialism with another. Intuition
doesn’t appear tabula rasa, even under the best of  apprenticeship circumstances. Even Kennedy,
whom I’ve cited above, recognizes the need for students to generate certain skills (issue spotting,
rules of  procedure, etc.) that would then enable them the flexibility to apply their accrued
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experience to complex issues. By recognizing that it’s not necessarily the skills that law school
students learn, but often how they are taught, that generates the kind of  criticism being leveled in
this essay, Scott’s frame can be rehabilitated. 
Scott’s emphasis on intuition receives theoretical support from Stuckey who contends that clinical
education and mature skill acquisition moves from a distanced manipulation of  clearly delineated
elements of  a situation according to formal rules toward involved behavior based on an
accumulation of  concrete experience. Over time, the learner gradually develops the ability to see
analogies, to recognize new situations as similar to whole remembered patterns, and finally, as an
expert to grasp what is important in a situation without proceeding through a long process of
formal reasoning.149
Stuckey continues by suggesting that in order for students to fully engage in experiential education
they must continuously be exposed to a four stage process that includes: experience, reflection,
theory, and application. 
A Way Forward
In this final section of  the paper I will offer two related but distinct assessments of  a possible way
forward to revised law school pedagogy. First, I will present a discussion of  the relevance of
dialogicality. Dialogicality is related to the second part of  this analysis, an emphasis on student
development theory. I will conclude this section with a brief  description of  a pedagogical model
that may be used to replace the more conventional law school teaching method. However, it is my
firm belief  that by supplying the necessary tools for deliberation over the multiple ways to
construct thoughtful and effective pedagogy readers can and should invest their time and energy
in crafting one that suits their respective courses. With that in mind, in the sections that follow I
provide considerable discussion of  those criteria now recognized to be associated with generating
good courses. At both an institutional and personal level, American law schools and law school
faculty must invest in the resources, time, and energy necessary to dedicate themselves to
professional development leading to higher quality pedagogy. None of  the innovations in teaching
discussed below will happen without earnest commitment at each level. 
Dialogical Method
In the context of  this essay, the urgency of  dialogical interactions speaks to the need for juridic
actors in the United States to engage in dialogical relations as a way to come to a more
comprehensive understanding of  who we are, all the while enhancing our understanding of  those
from distinctively different cultures. In this context I am speaking of  dialogue to mean “a
willingness to enter conversation about ideas, taking a position in openness that can still be altered
given additional information; a commitment to keep relationships affirming, even as disagreements
over theory occur; and a willingness to ask value questions about information application.”150 To
further clarify the key ingredients necessary to promote dialogical intercourse, Arnett summarizes
Rob Anderson’s explication of  “Presence; Unanticipated consequences; Otherness; Vulnerability;
Mutual Implication; Temporal flow; and Authenticity.”151 In short, dialogical interaction means
149 Roy Stuckey. 2007. “Teaching with Purpose: Defining
and Achieving Desired Outcomes in Clinical Law
Courses.” 13 Clinical L. Rev. 811.
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“reaching out to the other in an authentic fashion, willing to try to meet and follow the
unpredictable consequences of  exchange.”152
Consistent with points raised earlier in this essay, Arnett acknowledges three primary obstacles to
dialogical education fostered by academics themselves – careerism, a misguided focus on students
to the exclusion of  scholarship, and institutional survival.153 Briefly, Arnett suggests that a scholar’s
unhealthy near obsession with career objectives leads to narrow specializations that inhibit a more
global awareness of  social issues. Moreover, academics who cultivate specialized knowledge are
unable to speak to other academics and the larger community. This inhibits our ability to generate
ideas that are important for democracy to flourish because it limits students’ ability to generate
conceptually, empirically and theoretically integrated insights. More broadly trained and aware
academics can have a significant influence on the university and college campuses where they teach
and conduct research. Next, Arnett suggests that the emphasis on some campuses on being student-
centered, often at the expense of  scholarship, damages the dialogical process by inhibiting the ability
of  teachers to keep up with contemporary research. This move has been spawned in part by the
national focus on auditing discussed in the previous section, and emphasizes an approach to viewing
students as “clients” or “consumers.” Finally, over the course of  the last thirty years institutional
survival has been among the most pressing concerns for university officials. In response to growing
domestic and international competition for students and faculty, increasing costs associated with
operating high quality educational institutions, and steadily decreasing state and federal funding for
education, American universities have turned to faculty to assist with budget crises by procuring
federal and state grants. This process has its own internal dynamic in that grant funding initiatives
are often not consistent with the more broadly conceived pedagogical and scholarly pursuits
characteristic of  a liberal arts education. Thus, the internal institutional dynamics generating
pressures on faculty to assist with institutional survival necessarily fix our attention on narrowly
accepted mechanisms and curricula likely to extend the life and health of  the university. To counter
what Arnett sees as consistent pressures within academic institutions against generating dialogical
encounters, academics must press ahead with a broad-minded approach to a kind of  scholarship
reminiscent of  Renaissance thinkers who were well versed in the humanities and social sciences.
This is important not only because diverse scholarly training represents the foundation of  true
knowledge, it is important because by our efforts we model for students what it means to be
invested in and prepare for a life dedicated to deep understanding. As I alluded to earlier in this
essay, students arrive in graduate schools and law schools primarily focused on surviving the
graduate school experience, getting a job, and making money. Law school curricula, I have suggested,
does little to generate an alternative vision for them. Faculty who adopt a dialogical approach to
their own scholarly gestalt will symbolize a significant counter-hegemonic approach for their
students to emulate and in doing so will stimulate greater awareness of  the interconnectedness of
law with politics, economics, and culture. At bottom, argues Arnett, “dialogical education views
learning as an ongoing discussion of  information between persons in hopes of  making a difference
in the quality of  life we live with one another locally and globally.”154 To accomplish this, a
dialogically influenced scholar will approach subject matter with an emphasis on care and hope,
while recognizing disappointments, and avoiding cynicism.155 Like Dewey and James,156 Arnett
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privileges the practical philosophical pedagogy of  learning by doing. By combining the master
narratives found in books and journal articles with praxis-oriented experiential education157
students encounter the twin poles of  hope and disappointment and grow accordingly. 
Dialogue includes thoughtful engagement with both human beings and texts. As it is relevant to
our interests here, that means sincere interaction between law school faculty and students, students
and students, local practicing attorneys and judges, legal practitioners, legislators, and the lay
public each in the service of  enhanced knowledge of  the meaning and application of  law in the
service of  justice. In addition to interaction with people, we must also engage in critical
deconstruction and analysis of  juridic texts. Probing the meaning of  statutory and case law is
consistent with Sidorkin’s First and Second Discourses.158 The First Discourse signifies the
authority of  the text, a master narrative that establishes common ground where dialogicality exists
to generate a common perception of  the text. The Second Discourse provides for “speaking out”
about the text. This is an organic process that opens up the Master Narrative for deconstruction
and reinterpretation. For our purposes, a shared introduction to jurisprudence gives way to
dialogical deconstruction of  the merits of  that jurisprudence. Since texts are open to
interpretation this is inevitably an organic process that will never generate a singular truth, but
rather, through the process of  engaging the text will likely manifest in a transmogrified set of
interpretations expressive of  polyvocal and polycentered contingent subject identities, interests,
and awareness largely based on demographic factors such as class, race/ethnicity, gender, religious
affiliation, age, and the like. 
How, for example, might a law school student come to understand the ways Justice Antonin Scalia
and Justice Clarence Thomas view stare decisis? It is now well known that despite expressing an
originalist view of  the constitution, Justice Thomas sees no virtue in adhering to case precedent.159
And what should students make of  the epistemological commitment to originalism shared by Scalia
and Thomas? That is, by evoking an originalist constitutional framework for considering
contemporary issues appearing before the court aren’t we now in the realm of  interpretation? How
do we know what the Founders intent was? Isn’t it possible that thoughtful people will disagree
about the Founders original intent? A common problem addressed in any law school course
confronting separation of  powers issues concerns the question, “Who is the government lawyer’s
client?”160 Simply put, “Does a Justice Department attorney advising the White House on a matter
of  presidential authority represent the United States, the President, the Presidency, the Department
of  Justice, the people?”161 Given the controversy generated by the firing of  eight US Attorneys
during the time when Alberto Gonzales served as the US Attorney General a more timely question
would be hard to imagine. The legal framework for allowing the replacement of  the eight fired US
Attorneys without having to receive Senate approval appeared in the 2005 reauthorization of  the
USA Patriot Act. Section 502 “eliminates restrictions on the length of  service for interim U.S.
attorneys and allows future interim attorneys to serve indefinitely without Senate confirmation.”162
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Is this constitutionally protected? How do we decide who a government lawyer represents? The
Constitution is unclear on this point. In addition, is Section 502 of  the reauthorized Patriot Act a
subversion of  the Senate’s Constitutional authority to approve US attorneys? 
Another example appears in Chief  Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion upholding Miranda v.
Arizona163. In 2000, the Supreme Court heard Dickerson v. United States164. The question before the
Court in Dickerson was whether to uphold the requirement established in Miranda that custodial
suspects should be informed of  their right to remain silent, their right to legal representation, and
acknowledgement that anything said while in custody would be used against them. It was well
known that Chief  Justice Rehnquist had long held that in his view Miranda was bad law and should
be overturned. However, the Chief  Justice, writing for the majority, joined six other justices in
reaffirming the value of  Miranda. He did so because the implementation of  Miranda had become
ubiquitous in American culture, and was now established law. So while part of  his support for
Miranda in Dickerson rested easily upon stare decisis, Chief  Justice Rehnquist’s more nuanced
interpretation of  the cultural acceptability of  the law and its application played heavily on his
decision.165
Furthermore, an endless array of  phrases and concepts continue to perplex legal and social science
scholars. For example, what is the meaning of  “cruel and unusual punishment?” How do I know
when a behavior or item of  printed material has “shocked the conscience?” Who, exactly, is the
“reasonable man” in the law? These questions point to the need for intensive dialogue among law
school faculty, students, the community of  practitioners, and the public who are served by them. 
Dialogical intercourse is necessary for human beings to realize their humanity. To be truly human
is to acknowledge the essence of  the other. Without that acknowledgement “I” cannot exist. Said
differently, “failure to affirm the being of  the other brings myself  into non-being.”166 For Buber,
“all real living is meeting.”167 When communication breaks down we are prone to view the other
with mistrust and misunderstanding. We overly value our own opinions, and devalue those held
by our adversaries. Consider Martin Buber’s remarks:
Man is more than ever inclined to see his own principle in its original purity and the
opposing one in its present deterioration, especially if  the forces of  propaganda
confirm his instincts in order to make better use of  them… He is convinced that his
side is in order, the other side fundamentally out of  order, that he is concerned with
the recognition and realization of  the right, his opponent with the masking of  his
selfish interest. Expressed in modern terminology, he believes that he has ideas, his
opponent only ideologies. This obsession feeds the mistrust that incites the two
camps.168
Polarization of  discourse generates misunderstanding. Alternatively, a discourse that is
relationship-centered169 moves us closer to dialogical communication, and requires a commitment
on all sides to empathize with the other to come nearer to understanding. By asking questions in
the spirit of  a dialogical community we come closer to understanding, and we demonstrate a
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sincere commitment to enhanced awareness of  the multifaceted nature of  social problems and the
psycho-emotional investment subjects have in them. In the space that exists between questioner
and listener, and interpretation of  foundational texts, emerges the dialogical moment. Through our
ability to open up to others we begin to know ourselves more fully.170 This is precisely what Buber
means when he says that all real living is meeting. Through meaningfully shared discourse a process
of  true awakening unfolds for each interlocutor because each plays the role of  questioner and
listener. This dialogical process is what moves us nearer to our shared humanity. A really existing
dialogic or hermeneutic community would be a place where “partners must cooperate to establish
a mutual world in which they may or may not agree. What is important is how partners must
coordinate to establish meaning between themselves.”171 Guilar suggests that Gadamer’s
hermeneutic community is similar to Dewey’s “organic community” in that, like Dewey who
emphasized praxis as the way to true knowledge, for Gadamer “dialogic conversations about
concrete actions and reflections upon them [take] place within a context of  historic truths also
open to inquiry.”172 Most important for Gadamer is that interpretation of  dialogical moments is
open-ended. There is no attempt to establish truth once and for all.173
The most important lesson for us to draw from the body of  literature addressing hermeneutics and
dialogue is the potential for attaining real understanding. Despite our differences, which will always
be present, a process exists to promote sincere discovery and growth. Through our earnest
engagement with the other as listeners and questioners we humanize the other in a way that
validates them and ourselves. We learn from them, and they from us. Through dialogue we become
more fully realized as human beings. A truly dialogical classroom is by design crafted as a
humanistic alternative to the discourse of  the master. Where the master privileges priestly
dominance over knowledge, dialogical methods open up that knowledge to critique from all
interlocutors. It empowers previously marginalized subjects (students) to become integral
participants in the construction and interpretation of  meaning. 
To organize our classrooms as hierarchical fiefdoms by brow-beating our students to the point of
disillusionment and illness, or to fail to acknowledge and teach the political, economic, and
cultural impact of  the implementation of  law, or to dismiss the jurisprudential practices and
decisions emanating from international courts of  law limits our ability to grow, just as our refusal
to dialogue with our students, the legal community at large, and the public limits their ability to
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grow. Absent dialogue, we remain enshrouded in Buber’s apt description of  polarizing discourse
resulting in the preservation of  status quo hierarchical relationships based on power and ideology
that continue to stifle our efforts to truly realize a moral and just application of  the law. Happily,
plentiful resources now exist for law school faculty to invest in their own professional development
regarding best practices associated with high quality course creation and delivery. At bottom is a
strong emphasis on multiple modes of  dialogicality leading to the generation of  knowledge and its
long-term retention, as well as a commitment to teaching students how to teach themselves, and an
unapologetic dedication to enhancing student well-being. 
Student Development Theory
At this point it should be clear that law school pedagogy is devoid of  dialogue surrounding the
latest scholarship addressing student learning theory. Frankly, this is a problem facing university
teaching everywhere in the US, and in most disciplines.174 Many resources are available to provide
guidance to law professors seeking ways to enhance student comprehension and mastery of
concepts and legal theory. What I wish to do in this final section is to provide an overview of  a few
selected best practices. Then, I will offer some suggestions for ways to improve law school
pedagogy. 
What makes a high quality course? What are the criteria that make learning significant? According
to Fink,175 good courses are those that prioritize the following: they challenge students to
important kinds of  learning; they use active forms of  learning; they involve a caring teacher; there
is good student-teacher interaction; and there is a good system of  feedback, assessment, and
grading. As for the most significant learning criteria, Fink identifies six: foundational knowledge;
application; integration; human dimension; caring; and learning how to learn. Finally, but perhaps
most importantly, we must know the situational factors that combine to constitute the learning
environment. 
In the paragraphs that follow I will discuss the qualities of  good courses, especially the criteria for
significant learning, and situational factors. A well-designed course will ideally provide for the
realization of  each, albeit with course-specific uniqueness. 
At the heart of  quality teaching is “the attitudes of  the teachers, in their faith in their students’
abilities to achieve, in their willingness to take their students seriously and to let them assume
control of  their own education, and in their commitment to let all policies and practices flow from
central learning objectives and from a mutual respect and agreement between students and
teachers.”176 In his careful analysis of  the qualities possessed by the nation’s most prolific
university teachers, Bain’s important insight into how faculty approach the construction and
delivery of  their classes is invaluable. Foremost among these is awareness of  how students learn
best. As summarized by Bain, faculty from across the United States recognize that “People learn
most effectively (in ways that make a sustained, substantial, and positive influence on the way they
act, think, or feel) when (1) they are trying to solve problems (intellectual, physical, artistic,
practical, or abstract) that they find intriguing, beautiful, or important; (2) they are able to do so in
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a challenging yet supportive environment in which they can feel a sense of  control over their own
education; (3) they can work collaboratively with other learners to grapple with the problems; (4)
they believe that their work will be considered fairly and honestly; and (5) they can try, fail, and
receive feedback from expert learners in advance of  and separate from any judgment of  their
efforts.”177
Following decades of  careful scholarship pointing to the ways people learn and retain information,
a new paradigm of  university teaching has emerged.178 Following the work of  Campbell and Smith,
this new paradigm stresses the following: knowledge that is jointly constructed by the teacher and
the student; students become actively involved in constructing, discovering, and transforming
knowledge; modes of  learning that focus more on relating rather than memorizing; where the
faculty purpose is to develop students’ competencies and talents; student lifelong learning; a
personal relationship between students and students and faculty; cooperative learning in the
classroom; diversity and personal esteem, cultural diversity, and commonality; students are
empowered, power is shared among students and between students and faculty; assessment is
criterion-referenced (using rubrics and pre-defined standards), typically use performances and
portfolios; ways of  knowing are narrative based; epistemology is constructivist, emphasis is placed
on invention and inquiry; technology is used for problem solving, communication, collaboration,
information access, and expression; and that teaching is a complex skill that requires considerable
training. 
To facilitate the mandates of  the new paradigm there has emerged an impressive array of  teaching
strategies largely based on the pedagogical commitment to active and experiential learning. Among
them are: role-playing, simulation, debate, and case studies; writing to learn; small group learning;
assessment as learning; problem-based learning; service learning; and on-line learning.179 In
addition, law school faculty have been encouraged to institute brain storming (group problem
solving), buzz groups (brief  period of  issue discussion in class), demonstrations, free group
discussion, group tutorial, individual tutorials dedicated to one student, problem-centered groups,
programmed learning (using computer simulations), syndicate method (group work followed by
generation of  a report), synectics (group brain-storming with special techniques), and T-group
method (group and individual awareness therapy).180 The guiding ethic behind each of  these tools
is a commitment by quality teachers to generate answers to the following questions: 1) What
should my students be able to do intellectually, physically, or emotionally as a result of  their
learning? 2) How can I best help and encourage them to develop those abilities and the habits of
the heart and mind to use them? 3) How can my students and I best understand the nature, quality,
and progress of  their learning? And 4) How can I evaluate my efforts to foster that learning?181
Foundational knowledge is a basic understanding of  data, concepts, relationships and perspectives
within a given substantive area. Comprehension of  case law and statutes, for example, signifies
foundational knowledge. Application is the experience of  generating useful skills that can be
applied toward realization of  a project or action of  some kind, and that manifests the foundational
knowledge. Here the expectation is for the creation of  complex high quality projects that require
the combination of  three modes of  thought: practical, critical, and creative. Most law school
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projects require practical thinking in that they are focused on issue spotting, problem solving and
case methodologies. Enhanced application would also introduce students to critical and creative
thinking. Critical thinking is a pedagogical phrase that relatively few can actually define, let alone
manifest in a pragmatic way with exercises designed to cultivate it. I am particularly fond of  Roger
Darlington’s articulation of  the concept.182 Darlington’s exposition both defines the concept of
critical thinking, and describes how one masters it. Critical thinking, he argues, “centres not on
answering questions but on questioning answers” through a process of  “probing, analyzing, [and]
evaluating.”183 While there is certainly some critical thinking that takes place with regard to legal
case analysis, the weight of  precedent and demand for perpetuation of  the status quo limits the
students’ ability to challenge the authority on which decisions and practices rest. One of  the key
components of  critical thinking is the necessity to think outside the box. Darlington takes that
position one step further by contending that we should, “think the unthinkable.” Finally, and this
is so much more consistent with training in sociology than in law, to think critically is to
perpetually ask, “Why?” The question being posed here is, are law school students encouraged to
think critically? Are they encouraged to always ask, “Why?” Once one has begun “thinking the
unthinkable,” one has ventured into the last of  the three ways one can manifest thought and that
is through creative application and interpretation of  existing works. A more specific set of  critical
thinking criteria has been set out by Arnold Arons.184 According to Aarons, there are ten reasoning
abilities that students must learn.
• Consciously raising the questions “What do we know…? How do we know…? Why do we
accept or believe…? What is the evidence for…?”
• Being clearly and explicitly aware of  gaps in available information.
• Discriminating between observation and inference, between established fact and subsequent
conjecture.
• Recognizing the necessity of  using only words of  prior definition, rooted in shared experience,
in forming a new definition and avoiding being misled by technical jargon.
• Probing for assumptions beyond a line of  reasoning.
• Drawing inferences from data, observations, or other evidence and recognizing when firm
inferences cannot be drawn.
• Performing hypothetico-deductive reasoning; that is, given a particular situation, applying
relevant knowledge of  principles and constraints and visualizing, in the abstract, the plausible
outcomes that might result from various changes one can imagine to be imposed on the system.
• Discriminating between inductive and deductive reasoning.
• Testing one’s own line of  reasoning and conclusions for internal consistency.
• Developing self-consciousness concerning one’s own thinking and reasoning process.
University professors are keen to emphasize the significance of  critical thinking, especially in the
study and practice of  law. However, rarely if  ever are the principles of  critical thought clearly
articulated by the professor to the students. This kind of  reflexivity is necessary if  we are to
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generate the critical analytical skills indispensable to engaging legal scholarship and practice. 
Integration is in some ways related to creative thinking in that by engaging in integration a student
is required to analyze a problem using two or more disciplines. The idea is expand our knowledge
and understanding of  complex problems through multiple lenses. By doing so we are less likely to
become stultified by disciplinary essentialism. By engaging in a multi-disciplinary approach to
problems we are far more likely to generate a more comprehensive, penetrating, and lucid account.
We can accomplish integration in a number of  ways. We can introduce our students to alternate
ways of  thinking by having them read in non-juridic disciplines. We can introduce our students to
learning communities, associations of  professionals, activists, and practitioners who work along
side our students to better understand problems we are investigating. Finally, through techniques
such as journaling we can have the students think through their course-related problems in
thoughtful ways that emphasize integration with other disciplines, occupations, voluntary
associations, and the like. 
It is important that students understand that their lifelong learning and occupational experiences
have a human dimension to them. As I have already attempted to explain in this essay, far too often
the human dimension is sorely lacking in law school pedagogy. What is needed is a set of  exercises
that allow students to come to know themselves better, to know others better, and to generate a
stronger sense of  self-authorship. In the long run these exercises, along with all that has come
before, will enhance the ethical application of  the law. Related to the human dimension is the
notion of  caring. Simply put, we can generate exercises that encourage students to consider the
ways in which their interests, feelings, and values have changed over time. 
The last of  the criteria that will stimulate learning environments is “learning how to learn.” This
is a significant component of  any university-based training because it teaches students how to
become lifelong learners. In order to become a better student, faculty must facilitate ways for
students to develop their underlying concept of  learning or of  knowledge; they must develop
metacognitive awareness, so that they recognize that a deep approach is required, and
metacognative control, so that they can make appropriate meaning making moves; make
assessment demands explicit so that students understand that only full understanding will be
acceptable as a learning outcome; to combine theoretical and conceptual knowledge with
methodological analysis; learn to use concept maps to better integrate what students know;
become a self-directed learner; encourage deep-level thinking; increase questioning; develop critical
thinking capabilities; enhance reading skills; and enhance comprehensive monitoring of  their
learning. 
Situational factors also affect the quality of  course delivery. And while some information that may
assist with faculty awareness of  a particular factor is hard to know until the class has been
formulated, it is important to generate. According to Fink185 there are six situational factors: 1) the
context of  the learning situation; 2) Expectations of  external groups; 3) the nature of  the subject
matter; 4) the characteristics of  the learners; 5) the characteristics of  the teacher; and 6) special
pedagogical knowledge. Lets briefly consider each. In order to properly facilitate the kind of
learning we’ve emphasized in this section the teacher needs to know a few things about the learning
situation. Specifically, we need to know how many students we’ll have, what level they will be (first,
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second, or third year law), how often the class will meet, and the format in which the course will
be delivered. Next, what are the expectations being held by external groups with respect to the
product we produce. That is, what does society at large need and expect in terms of  the education
of  these students? This is a significant question and one that must be repeatedly addressed by law
school faculty, and the American Bar Association. Each faculty member should be able to respond
to this question with a statement of  principle. For example, a criminal procedure professor could
say that she recognizes her role in producing thoughtful, intelligent, capable, well-spoken, good
writers with a fundamental knowledge of  criminal procedure. Is there a curricular emphasis on
ethics, or on critical thinking? If  so, does the curriculum support the culturally identified
expectation? With respect to wrongful and unlawful conviction, for example, what are the broader
political, economic, and cultural expectations of  law school graduates and their faculty, and how
well does the curriculum address those expectations? 
What is the nature of  the subject matter? Faculty should identify whether the subject matter is
convergent, requiring a single answer, or divergent, requiring multiple possible answers. Faculty
should also be aware of  whether the subject matter is relatively stable over time, or is rapidly
changing. Next, we’ll want to know more about our students. For example, are they part-time, do
they have family responsibilities, work responsibilities, etc. This information will be handy when
considering how to use the skill-base of  the students to enhance the creation of  knowledge in class.
Why did the students want to enroll in this class? What are their specific career goals? Finally, if
it’s possible, we want to know about the students’ learning styles. Again, some of  this information
may not be available until after students convene at the commencement of  a new semester. But it
may be an important set of  variables necessary to construct an optimal learning environment. 
The remaining set of  situational variables includes the characteristics of  the teacher, and special
pedagogical knowledge. Here what is required is sincere reflexivity on the part of  the teacher. How
much knowledge about the topic I’m teaching do I possess? What is my experience in this area?
What skills and aptitudes do I bring to bear? By earnestly answering these questions the teacher is
better situated to identifying areas of  weakness that may require additional focused professional
development before embarking on the course. 
Special pedagogical knowledge speaks to the need for teachers to understand the limitations they are
facing upon entering a new semester. These may be limitations of  space, access to technology, place-
bound students (making trips off  of  campus difficult), experience and skill levels of  the students, and
the level of  fear about the material that students bring with them to the classroom. This is clearly an
issue for law school faculty who face students who are not only intimidated by the material they are
confronting in class, but who are intentionally placed in a highly competitive environment. The
combination of  these factors makes for a challenging set of  pedagogical obstacles to generating true
knowledge of  the sort that will stay with a student for many years post-graduation. 
The final bit of  student development theory that I’d like to emphasize is assessment. Of  course,
American law schools primarily make use of  timed examinations, with a few upper division
courses assigning research papers. The question is whether the assessment tool used by law schools
has ever been thoughtfully discussed within the context of  quality pedagogy leading to
information and skill retention. Education scholars have been discussing alternative assessment
devises for many decades and have argued for what they term forward looking assessment.186 Law
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school examinations are backward looking in that they focus on assessing what has been covered
in the class up to a certain point. Forward looking assessment focuses more on doing something
with the information and skills generated in the course. Some case method analysis certainly gets
at the “doing” part of  assessment. In general, assessment should be realistic (focused on real-world
situations); require judgment and innovation (to solve unstructured problems); active (student has
to carry out exploration and work within the discipline); replicate or simulate the contexts in
which adults are tested in the workplace (with concomitant contexts, constraints, purposes and
audiences); assess the student’s ability to use a repertoire of  knowledge and skill efficiently and
effectively to negotiate a complex task; and allow appropriate opportunities for students to
rehearse, practice, consult resources, and get feedback on and refine performances and products.187
Application of Student Learning Theory to Law School Pedagogy
Some of  our work has been done for us. In two recently published documents – the Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of  Teaching’s Educating Lawyers, and Stuckey et.al. Best
Practices for Legal Education188 – there is a wealth of  information available to reconstitute law
school pedagogy consistent with insights garnered from student development theory. Even the
much discussed MacCrate Report, first published in 1992, contained an effort to divine
fundamental lawyering skills necessary for an attorney to be successful.189 These skills form the
foundation of  a thoughtful approach to developing course-specific goals and bear reading again and
again. MacCrate identified ten fundamental skills, and four professional values that were tied to
the successful practice of  law. Examples include:
• Identify and diagnose a problem;
• Generate alternative solutions and strategies;
• Develop a plan of  action;
• Implement the plan;
• Identify and formulate legal issues;
• Formulate relevant legal theories;
• Evaluate legal theory;
• Know the nature of  legal rules and institutions;
• Know of  and have the ability to use legal research tools;
• Determine the need for factual investigation;
• Plan a factual investigation;
• Implement the investigative strategy;
• Organize information;
• Assess the perspective of  the recipient of  information;
• Use effective communication techniques;
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• Prepare for negotiation;
• Conduct negotiation
Each of  these course goals emphasizes the identification, analysis, synthesis, and application that
was earlier identified as among the most significant mechanisms for promoting long-term
knowledge and skill. Once these have been articulated faculty can then move to determination of
the specific instruction method to be used (e.g., problem based, team based, or accelerated).
The Carnegie report specifically emphasizes moving to an integrated curriculum that combines an
emphasis on legal doctrine and analysis, an active component that focuses on practice as a lawyer,
and assuming the values and identity of  a practicing attorney.190 With regard to the active learning-
by-doing emphasis found in student development theory, the Carnegie report suggests that law
schools must incorporate lawyering, professionalism and legal analysis from the first year on. Law
schools are encouraged to support faculty to work across the curriculum, and across institutions.
Finally, the Carnegie Report suggests that a primary focus should be on weaving together disparate
kinds of  knowledge and skill. As was mentioned in the previous section, this is a cornerstone of
integration and a necessary component of  Fink’s significant learning criteria. In short, the
Carnegie Report articulates a vision of  law school pedagogy that is consistent with best practices.
Consider the list of  six skills that core legal education should provide: 
1. Developing in students fundamental knowledge and skill, especially an academic knowledge
base and research.
2. Providing students with the capacity to engage in complex practice.
3. Enabling students to learn to make judgments under conditions of  uncertainty.
4. Teaching students how to learn from experience.
5. Introducing students to the disciplines of  creating and participating in a responsible and
effective professional community.
6. Forming students able and willing to join an enterprise of  public service.191
Once again, these six skill sets represent core goals for all advanced education regardless of  the
disciplinary focus. 
A more extensive assessment and forward looking treatment of  law school pedagogy was
published by Stuckey et al. who contend that, “most law schools do not employ the best practices
for educating lawyers.”192 So concerned with the current state of  law school pedagogy and its
failure to properly prepare graduates for the practice of  law that the authors titled one section of
their report, “The Licensing Process is Not Protecting the Public.” Their first invective is directed
at the Bar examination process and the failure of  the Bar to adequately assess the skills needed to
succeed as a professional. But their third key point focuses specifically on law school curriculum
and pedagogy, “Law Schools Are Not Fully Committed to Preparing Students for Practice.”
Specifically, Stuckey et al. contend that, “law schools should expand their educational goals,
improve the competence and professionalism of  their graduates, and attend to the well-being of
their students.”193 Consistent with best practices as they relate to student development theory,
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Stuckey et al., recommend an overhaul of  the law school curriculum. Following the work of  Judith
Wegner, the first year curriculum should emphasize: intellectual tasks, legal literacy, legal analysis,
application, synthesis, evaluation, implicit messages (like how the law interacts with the “outside
world”), learning in context (addressing real world profession problems), and notable gaps
(understanding law from the perspective of  intellectual and social contexts to avoid
misimpressions).194
The Stuckey et al., report is a comprehensive assessment and set of  recommendations for ways to
significantly improve law school education consistent with the most recent insight generated by
student development theory. As best as I can tell, the authors have attempted to communicate a
new way forward that includes each of  the points I raised in the student learning theory section.
That is, the report focuses on the generation of  foundational knowledge, application, integration,
the human dimension, and caring. For example, the author’s provide important insight into
outcomes based course design, and include examples from law professors across the US. They
implore faculty to generate clearly articulated learning objectives that include the levels of
competency expected by the faculty. Stuckey et al., pay careful attention to the need for developing
knowledge, skills and values, and place strong emphasis on the integration of  theory, doctrine and
practice. Consistent with the situational factors listed above, Stuckey et al., join with Fink in urging
faculty to know their subject well, to improve their teaching pedagogy, to create and maintain
healthy teaching and learning environments, to do no harm to students, to support student
autonomy, to foster student and faculty collaboration, to give regular and prompt feedback, to help
students become self-directed learners (a key component of  experiential learning – doing
something), reduce reliance on the Socratic method by employing multiple teaching strategies, employ
context-based learning (placing students in the environments they will be working in), integrate
practicing attorneys and judges into the learning process, and use technology to enhance access to
information. Once again it bears repeating that this thorough report moves nearly in lock step with
current best practices regarding student development theory, and provides detailed examples for
ways law professors can implement the various recommendations. 
Chapter Five of  the Stuckey et al. report is dedicated entirely to the construction of  high quality
experiential courses. Space limitations prevent me from presenting a thorough discussion of  this
section, so I will simply say that the thorough presentation of  best practices and the benefits of
experiential course offerings speaks holistically to the criteria established by education theorists
Fink, Bain, and others, as well as clinical law professors Findley, Stiglitz, Brooks, Shulman, and
Medwed, each of  who were cited in the Introduction and have spent their professional careers
enhancing the live client clinic experience. In short, by engaging students in the act of  doing we
create in them the ability to develop life-long learning skills and professionalism. Chapter Six
provides faculty with alternatives to the Socratic method, and Chapter Seven speaks to quality
assessment. 
The Stuckey et al. report is the most comprehensive assessment and proposal for a new and
improved law school pedagogy based on student learning theory that I’ve encountered. It pulls
together best practices from across a broad spectrum of  learning theorists both within and outside
of  the law school arena. What is clear from this report is that there are many ways for faculty to
approach their teaching to enhance student performance and professionalism. I would even go so
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far as to say that the report is a clarion call for law school faculty to engage in their own
professional development as it pertains improved pedagogy. If  Stuckey et al. are correct in their
projections the future of  the profession is at stake. 
A Pedagogical Alternative
Returning for a moment to Moliterno’s recommendation that an integrated law school curriculum
would be structured around a three-year long simulated practice is indicative of  the recognition of
the need to implement the best practices suggested by student development theory. It is also
supported by Scott’s emphasis on the need for law school students to adopt a sort of  legal intuition
that can only come from working real cases with real people who have real problems. Because no
case has precisely the same components the non-linearity of  each case requires students to develop
their critical thinking skills. Moreover, it requires laws schools to prepare students for life-long
learning. This is where integration comes in. By reconceptualizing the law school curriculum as a
three-year long simulated law practice students will be forced to understand and evaluate legal
doctrine and theory, know the nature of  legal rules and institutions, know how to use legal research
tools, know professional ethical responsibilities, know how to conduct factual investigations,
organize information, use effective communication techniques, and conduct negotiations. In
addition, this commitment to an integrated curriculum emphasizes closer and more respectful
relationships with students. Students are required to take greater responsibility for their own
education by teaching themselves the information they will need to learn to be effective lawyers.
Faculty will guide the entire enterprise by paying special attention to best practices associated with
course delivery methods and assessment. Lacanian concerns over divided subjects are minimized
because realization of  student-centered learning – one that privileges dialogicality, student
investment in their own learning process, respect for polyvocality, and experientially based
pedagogy – enables subjects to pursue realization of  their own authenticity. In short, a
comprehensive three-year long integrated curriculum will produce a law school graduate more
prepared to engage the unpredictable world of  legal practice. 
With the proposal for a three-year long integrated curriculum Moliterno’s recommendation
appears to make a straightforward argument for replacing contemporary law school curricula with
a superimposed experiential model. By doing so, the benefits of  clinical education would accrue to
the full law school student body over the course of  their tenure in their respective departments.
No longer would clinics be marginalized, they would become the normative model of  effective law
school pedagogy. 
IV Conclusion
If  Einstein is correct, that we cannot solve significant problems at the same level of  thinking we
were at when we created them, then I believe we must not only familiarize ourselves with counter-
hegemonic pedagogical discourses to confront entrenched law school curricula, we must also be
willing to aggressively act on the principles guiding those discourses. Among other things, this
requires headlong engagement with the American Bar Association and the administrations in law
schools across the United States. The scholarly ammunition needed to do this has been provided
to us. As referenced in the first part of  this essay, the McCrate Report, Best Practices for Legal
Education: A vision and A Road Map, and the Carnegie Foundation’s Educating Lawyers:
Preparation for the Profession of  Law, each provide us with careful scrutiny of  the many problems
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facing the legal profession, and the tools for law schools to correct their curricula and pedagogy to
appropriately address them. But there are clear pragmatic reasons why they won’t. 
Despite claims from law school administrators that clinics are too expensive to operate, the real
macro-structural reason for their lack of  support is that law schools exist to serve the interests of
the dominant and the powerful. Their curricula is designed to reproduce status quo political,
economic, and cultural relations in such a way that they make the possibility of  a truly existing
justice virtually impossible to attain. While they may pay lip service to their responsibility for
teaching students how to preserve constitutionally protected rights, their graduates are molded in
to “legal machines” ill prepared to critically question and analyze the structural variables serving
to promote inequitable social relations. And this is by design. 
Live client innocence projects can serve a valuable role by articulating the discourse of  the hysteric.
From within the broader master narrative, the hysteric will reject positivist attempts to view the
law as objective, and the training in the law as monolithic. This is important because the dialectical
interplay of  opposing forces through the expression of  competing narratives has the effect of
generating institutional instability. Largely because of  their participation in clinical education,
innocence project graduates are better situated to understand their professional responsibility to
serving justice. The results of  their work may even generate exonerations and policy changes that
serve to fragment dominant cultural expressions of  due process. In doing so, opportunities arise
to inject alternative discourses – new formerly subjugated narratives seeking more diverse
interpretations of  behaviors and texts. But until the head of  the snake is removed, that is, until
status-quo law school curriculum is redesigned in line with the recommendations for greater
dialogicality geared toward critical analysis of  the confluence of  law with political, economic, and
cultural factors leading to social justice, I’m afraid that innocence project clinics, like all live client
clinics, will continue to be marginalized by a discursive process that separates legitimate from
illegitimate discourse. Finally, and most dramatically as it pertains to the activities of  innocence
project clinicians and wrongful and unlawful conviction scholars teaching in law schools, failure to
radically redesign law school curricula will have the effect of  perpetuating the proliferation of
values and behaviors known to generate wrongful and unlawful convictions. Until the paradigmatic
pedagogical shift I’ve recommended in this manuscript is adopted these clinicians and scholars will
be forced to continue shouting their warnings for systemic change from the bleacher seats. 
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